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A signi (Jcant proportion of the world's population are routinely subjected to abuse,
torture, humiliation, starvation and mutilation simply because they are fen1ale, more so
in Africa where women's rights are still often viewed as distinct from human rights.
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This raises the question of state responsibility for protecting women's human rights.
Women, as much as men, are entitled to full protection of their rights and freedoms
because they are human beings.
A decade ago, the United Nations summarized the burden of gender inequality by
stating that women composed one--half of the world's population and performed two
thirds of the world's work, but earned only one tenth of the world's income and owned
1
only onc hundredth of the worlds property.-
A look at the constitutions of nlany Southe111 African states would suggest that women
enjoy equality and access to first generation hunlan rights across the region. In most of
these constitutions 'discrimination' on the grounds of gender is prohibited, but the
governments frequently do not have the nlechanisms in place to enforce these
constitutional provisions effectively and women are therefore subjected to widespread
practices of discrimination, violence and inequality.
'Katarina Tomsevski 'Women and Human Rights' Introduction Women and Lu)\' De\'(!!ojJment Series
(1995)
:! Nina 1. Crimm 'Introductory Remarks' Womel1.\' Rights as Intematiol1a! Human Rights St Johns Law
Review (1995) Vo!. 69 @}3
Although party to inte111ational human rights instruments that advocate gender
equality, African states still take a particularly selective view of wonlen 's human rig11ts
and make this contingent upon local custom. Then one might find that the constitution
and civil law give women the same rights as men, but make these subject to traditional
practices that limit women's rights. This dissertation will address the issue of how
customary laws linlit women's human rights and will examine the role of the courts
therein. We will also briefly look at the application of intel11ational human rights
dOClllnents in domestic courts.
In order to constructively and comprehensively examll1e the topic within the space
constraints dictated, I had to limit this paper to a survey of five Southern African states
that were chosen bccause of their common language, cultural and legal dualism,
colonial histories, and the availability of case law. This paper will cover specific issues
that affect women in the personal law of marriage, divorce, property rights and
inheritance and will be linlited to those areas where nlost inequalities occur. The
reason that this paper will concentrate on the above-mentioned issues is that family law
is central to African social, political and econonlic life. The ilnportance of family law
in traditional African systems cannot be sufficiently emphasized as it has been noted
that in any study of African traditional economic and political arrangcments, the notion
of family impinges upon almost every area of community life3. These traditional rules
are not merely historical curiosities but are part and parcel of the living domestic law in
most Southe111 African states. We will now exanline these donlestic legal systenls.
:I T. W. Bennett 'Soureebook alA/dean Customary Lall"( 1991 )~l?311
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CHAPTER 1
A) GENERAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
1. DOl\1ESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS AND CON'STITUTIONS
All the countries that are reflected in this work derived their constitutional heritage
frOlu the British legal systen1. The colonial govenlnlents were initially sympathetic to
African women, whom they perceived as living in virtual bondage.4 This did not
accord with the ideals of female emancipation that was gradually gathering in1petus in
Nineteenth Century Europe.s The courts were prepared, grudgingly, to free African
women from some of the constraints of customary law on the basis of conflict of laws,
namely that they had abandoned a 'tribal' way of li fe and had adopted a western onc,
and were therefore entitled to the protection afforded by the weste111 system. This
tentative n10ve to alleviate the position of women was soon abandoned and after the
1930s the courts made no further efforts to interfere with customary law and were
content to treat women in the sanle way as common law minors, an approach that was
both misguided and prejudicial to its subjects.(l
All the countries, save for Swaziland, now provide for multiparty democracy and all
the countries have incorporated a Bill of Rights into their constitutions which contain
limiting provisions relating to human rights. The equality provisions in the various
4 See T. W. Bennet Sourcebook ofAji'ican CusIO/}w/}' Law (1991)@ 321
'See T. W Bennet Sourcebook ofA/dcan CllSIOl//{//)'!aw (1991) 0} 321
6See T.W. Helmet Sourcebook ofA/h'cwz ellS/Ol1ZWY la\\' (1991) @ 322/323
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constitutions all regard discritnination on the grounds of a person's sex as unlawful and
provide cqual protection for all people.7
All the countries have a dual legal systcm, with the customary law of the people
coexisting with the general law of the land. A general discussion of the legal systcms
wil1 now be addressed under the relevant country headings.
Botswana
In Botswana constitutional power is shared between the president and the elected
National Assembly.~ Section 3 of the Constitution9 affords equal protection to all
persons. irrespective of their sex, and accordingly discrimination in thc sensc of
unequal treatment is unconstitutional. In addition to the right to equality for all, the
constitution contains specific provisions for respect to integrity and for the person. IO It
should be 111entioned that the constitution does not include sex as a ground on which
laws should not be based,11 although of late this particular provision has attracted a lot
of attention because of the case of Unity Dow. 12This case has made a significant impact
on the way the judiciary interprets the relevant equality clauses in the constitution. The
learned .i udge Agunda said that:
" I conceive that the primary duty of the judges is to make the constitution grow and
7 At least on paper.
II http:! w\Vw.state.gov.botswana
C) Constitution of Botswana 1966
10 Constitution of Botswana 1966-Section 3
11 Constitution of Botswana 1966 - Section 15
12 Attome." General l'S Unity Dmv BCLR 1994 (6) a full review of the case will be discussed below.
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develop in order to 111eet the just demands and aspirations of an ever developing
society which is part of a wider and larger human society governed by some
acceptable concepts of human dignity.,,13
In the case of SR. C of Molepofe College of Education vs A,ttorney General of
Botsltvanc/-I the Appeal Court continued with its liberal interpretation of Section 3 of
the c011stitution especially on the question of Locus Standi of appel1ants which will
enhance a litigants access to the courts to chal1enge constitutional infractions. IS
The dual legal system has a signi ficant impact on the legal position 0f women I(lwhere
the customary law of the people coexists with the civil law of Botswana, which
consists mainly of Roman Dutch law and statutes. 17 The customary law consists of
traditional laws and practices of specific tribes, which are not codi (led and are
therefore harder to interpret. 18
The court system also reflects this dual nature with the lower and higher customary
courts and various grades of 111agistrates and high courts existing side by side. Both
civil and customary courts of appeal exist and all courts are conlpetent to apply
1.1 Note 10 above ({li4 fg-h
I~ Unreported Ci",:jJ Appeal No 13 of 1994, Misca No 396 of 1993. Judgement deli\'ered on 31 January
1995- In this case female students at the college had to disclose their pregnancy and thereafter leave the
college and if they fell pregnant a second time they could never return, their male counterparts on the
other hand could be responsible for any number of pregnancies at the college and suffer no such liability.
15E. K. Quansah ' Is the Right to Get Pregnant a Fundamental Human Right in Botswana' 1995 JA.L.97
16A. Molokomme 'Women's law in Botswana laws and research needs' in The Legal Sitl/ation of
WOlJlen ill SOl/them Aji"ica (eds) Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong
17 Supra note 16 above @. 9
1~ Supra note 16 above @12
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customary law in the proper cases. Where customary law is not properly applicable,
19
these courts are to apply the common law.
South Africa
This is the only constitution amongst all the countries discussed that prohibits
discrin1ination in all its fOll11S and places a duty on the constitution to promote gender
equality and national unity. It further proclain1s constitutional principles and Chapter 5
of the constitution comn1ences with a general responsibility of all to promote equality
generally. Section 27 reiterates the general responsibility by a social commitment to
all to pron10te gender equality. Section 26 places a responsibility on all persons
operating in the public domain, including ministers, who must adopt equality plans and
abide by prescribed codes of practice and take measures to promote eq ual ity. 20
Specific fOll11S of gender discrin1ination prohibited by the Act include the system of
preventing won1en froll1 inheriting family property, fen1ale genital muti lation and any
practice including traditional, custonlary or religious practices which unfairly violate
the dignity of women and undermine equality between men and women. 21
In keeping with the above, section 11 (3) of the Black Administration Act No. 38 of
1927 has been repealed because it was inconsistent with the equality provisions. The
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No 4 of 2000 was
19 Supra note 16 above @ 11
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Actl 08 of 1996 -Sections 26,27
21 De Waal et al The Bill ofRights Handbook @207
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passed in January 2000 and the Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998 came into
effect in November 2000.
Black South Africans are currently subject to two sets of personal laws existing side-
by-side, namely customary and civil law, which do not always treat mcn and womcn as
equals. In reality some religious and customary practices result in the unequal
treatn1ent of won1en. The history of dual legal systen1s during colonial and apartheid
rule has had a negative in1pact on the rights of black won1en, and the constitutional
guarantee of gender equality now requires that constitutionally acceptable principles in
both the civi I and customary law systems be integrated into a single system avai lable to
all South Africans or that it be abolished altogether.
In the President ofthe Repuhlic ofSouth Africa vs Hugo 22the Constitutional Court
acknowledged the centrality of human dignity to the prohibition of unfair
discrilnination and stated that:
"At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a
society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect
regard less 0 f their membership of particular groups. The achievement 0 f such a
11 1997 (4) SA ~&1 (CC)
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society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that is the
goal of the constitution should not be overlooked or forgotten.,,23
The courts have been liberal in their entrenchment of gender equality and even when
prosecuting an offence, any discrimination on the grounds of gender, race or disability
will be an aggravating factor. Further all Magistrates and High courts are Equality
courts for their areas of jurisdiction and within the n10netary lin1its of their jurisdiction.
Swaziland
The Kingdom of Swaziland is a monarchy in which legislative and executive powers
vest in the King, and the King rules according to unwritten laws and customs in
conjunction with a politically elected government. 24 Duality of legal and political
systems is endenlic to Swazi life and the King presides over the traditional and western
hierarchies.
The King alleged a constitutional nl0narchy, but fron1 197325 the constitution of
Swaziland has been suspended and cUITently the country has no written constitution
although a constitutional revIew commIssIon has been in existence from 1996.2()
Further, a new Decree no.2 of 2001 was issued by the head of state which has
restricted the exercise of fundamental rights and legal challenges have been nulli fied
23 @ PARA 41
24 R.T. Nhalpo 'The Legal Situation of Women in Swaziland and some thoughts on Research' The Legal
Sitl/ation of Women in SOl/them Aji'ica (eds) Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong {ji>,97
25 Section 2e of the Proclal11ation ofthe Nation of 12 April 1973
2<> http/www.amnesty.org (Anmesty International report on Swaziland dated July 2001 )
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by special "Legal Notices" which prevent legal challenges and declare certain court
'1"ulings null and void. 27 This is not conducive to a healthy prOlTIotion of human rights.
The duality of legal systems exists but is strictly separate and Swazis are subject to two
sets of law. The Swazi Courts apply only Swazi law and custom while the civil system
is restricted to Roman Dutch common law and statutes. The exception is the High court
and Appeal court.28 S0l11etinles under special circumstances l11atters can be transferred
from the Magistrates court to the Swazi Court but the legal system itself is so
complicated that cust0l11ary law seems to be getting stronger rather than weaker2\).
There is a tendency for people to conlply with extra legal cultural practices and ignore
the existing legal principle. Women tend to favor the western system because it is more
sympathetic to women's issues than the customary courts.\o. The King has the sole
discretion to appoint judges and also dete1111ines the terms of such appointment)l, and
failure of the law to COITect inequities is l10where nlore apparent than in the field of
women's rights.
Zambia
The constitution of Zambia reflects the influence of the British Westminster system,J2
17 www.amnesty. org (Anmesty international report on Swaziland dated July 2001)
'::1- Supra note 24 above @ 103
''J- Supra note 24 above @ 107
30 Supra note 24 above @ 105
31 This would clearly affect the Independence of the Judiciary.
32 In the United Kingdom there is an unwritten constitution and the parliament is the supreme law
making body.
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but contains 1110difications sinlilar to son1e Southern African nations. The constitution
33
contains the provisions for fundamental rights and freedoms regardless of race, tribe,
place or origin, colour, creed, sex or marital status, however these protections are
subject to certain limitations34 and constitutional provisions proscribing sex
discrimination are confined to enumerated areas and do not address the inj ustices
inflicted through application of aspects of customary law.35
Zanlbia is a unitary state and power is divided between the president and legislature
and the courts have very little, if any, power of judicial review although they are given
a role by the constitution for en forcement of fundamental rights.l(). Constitutional
review consists of Ad Hoc Tribunals that may report on the constitutionality of certain
laws before enactment.
The dual legal systenl consists of custon1ary law and general law based on English law,
and exists only in relation to personal law, and then only in 111atters of 111alTiage, rights
in respect of land, and succession, and in these areas operate side by side with the
general law. In matters of public law the general law governs all Zambians. 37
:n The 1996 Constitution - The constitution of Zambia was amended under Act No. 18 of 1996.
-'4 Art. 23 makes exceptions to which the prohibition against discrimination does not apply.
-,s, Constitutionalism in Zambia' - J.A.L.1996 Vol 40 No. 2 (s~275
-'c, Art. 20 of the Constitution of Zambia 1996
-'7 CN Himonga, K.A. Turner, CS.Beyani 'An outline of the legal status of women in Zambia' in The
Legal Situation of WOl1len ill Southern Africa ([~ 139
la
The j ud iciary consists of a SUpreITIe court, a high court, and other courts created by the
legislature. 3x Article 91 of the constitution requires the judges of the courts to be
independent and inlpartial and subject only to the constitution and the law.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is a unitary state and the constitution was initially based on the British
Westnlinster systeITI, but nlajor reVISions Sl11ce their independence has greatly
increased the power of the President as head of state. 39 His power is shared with the
government, the legislature and the courts, which have limited powers of judicial
review. The Declaration of Rights sets forth a number of fundamental rights and
freedoms which every person in Zimbabwe is entitled to, regardless of his race, tribe,
place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex. These rights are subject to
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for public interest:w
The Zin1babwean Constitution expressly states that:
"This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent
with this constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void".-II
38 Supra note 37 above
39Geoff Feltoe 'Basic Information on the Constitutional and Legal System of Zimbabwe' Zilll!Ja!Jwc
Lall' RCl'icw ([1),166
40 Mary Mab~reke 'Women under Zimbabwean Law' Zilllbahll'c Law RcviclI' Vo!. 6 1988 ([0 64
41 Sec. 3 of the Zimbabwe Constitution
II
"
There is a dual legal systenl 111 Zinlbabwe consisting of the general law and the
custoll1ary law.
The general law is an amalgam of Roman Dutch law, heavily inOuenced by English
law and statute law.42 In the civil sphere the customary law is applied to regulate the
rights and obligations of black Zinlbabweans living a traditional way of Iife.
43
All courts in Zilnbabwe have jurisdiction to apply custOlnary law and primary courts
and community courts apply only the customary law and such general law that has
specifically been placed within their jurisdiction. Although the High Court has
jurisdiction to apply customary law, it routinely refers such cases to the District
Commissioner's Courts ..~4
In terms of section 79A of the Constitution, the judiciary consists of judges and
persons presiding over courts subordinate to the High Court. This includes judges,
nlagistrates and presiding officers in local courts. Section 79B provides that when
exercising his judicial authority a member of the judiciary shall not be subject "to the
direction and control of any person or authority, except to the extent that a written law
may place him under the direction or control of another member of the judiciary.,,45
.p
-Supra note 39 above @166
·B Supra note 39 above
H Supra note 39 above ({iJ 167
~,
. Supra note 39 above @> 169
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Since independence the government has enacted major laws aimed at enhancing
women's rights and intends revising certain traditional practices that discriminate
against women.
CONCLUSION
In most of the countries under review, the standard source of national human rights
nonns is the written constitution. Constitutions are by their nature both normative and
aspirational, and are regarded as embodying the essential principles upon which
citizens wish their society to be organized. Whether they in fact reflect the wishes of
the citizens or whether the citizens even know what is in them is another subject that is
outside the scope of this document. Some academics have argued that sex
discrimination is a hunlan rights issue that can be addressed by national legal systems
far nl0re effectively than by any intenlational mechanisl1l.46 However, it is submitted
that it is ilnpossible to discuss national human rights norms in isolation from the global
context, since these are perceived of as universal principles, which 111 fact generally
derive from intenlational instruments.
4<> Marsha A Freeman in 'Women, Law and the Land at the local level' Claiming Womens Human
Rights in Domestic Legal systems Human Rights Quartely Vol. 16 1994 @563
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INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
One strategy for dealing with the problem of discrimination against women in Africa
has been through state ratification and enforcement of treaties that establish
inte111ationally applicable standards of performance for the states and obligate those
states to submit regular reports about steps they have taken or should take:
n
The United Nations Charter was the first to affirm explicitly the human rights of men
and women in its preanlble and includes a person's sex among the prohibited grounds
of discrimination. Subsequently, there have been many conventions and treaties that
protect women's human rights.4g The Universal Declaration of Human Rights-+l); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,SO and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights51 all recognize equal rights of men and
women and make their provisions applicable to al1 without distinction as to sex. 52
These instru'ments attempt to reduce econonlic, social and political barriers to the
advancelnent of women.53 Unfortunately, such efforts renlain well removed froln the
lives of African women in Southe111 Africa.
-17 Claude .E. Welch Jr 'Human rights and African women-A comparison of Protection Under Two
Major Treaties' - HUl1lull rights QlIurle~,' 1993 Vol 15
-IX A list of these can be found in the Appendix
-I
l
) Adopted 10 Dec 1948 - U.N. DOC A/8lO
50 Adopted 16 Dec 1966 entered into force 23 mar. 1976U.N. DOCA/6316
51 Adopted 16 Dec 1966 entered into force Jan U.N. DOCA/6316
52 Article 2( 1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-
Documents reprinted in WOl1lens Rights ill International DoclIments - Winston E. Langley (1991 )
53 Supra note 47 above
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It is only lately since the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women54 (hereinafter CEDAW) and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights, (hereiilafter African Charter)5) that Southern African
courts have taken advantage of the rights afforded to women therei n and have referred
f I
· ., S()
to some 0 t lelr provIsions:
All the states under discussion, except for Swaziland, are parties to the
aforementioned treaties.57 The African Charter sets out the basic obligations of state
parties to 'recognize' and to 'adopt' legislative and other measures to give 'effect' to
the rights and freedoms in the Charter. 5RThe judicial application of the African Charter
will depend on the status that international rights enjoy in a local legal system. It is
unlikely that judicial institutions will make findings based on the provisions of the
African Charter if it is not regarded as part of domestic law. 59
CEDAWand the Optional Protocol to CEDAW60, have been signed by all the States
and signatories are obliged to condenln discrin1ination against women in all its forms
and pursue a policy of elinlinating such discrimination. 61
:i-l Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979U.N. Doe. A/RES/34/180
entered into force on 3 Sept. 1981 (Womens Convention)
~:i African Charter 0;1 Human and Peoples Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entered into force Oct. 21 19S6
~() See generally on SA- John Dugard 'The Role of International Law in Interpreting a Bill of Rights'
SAJf-IR 1994 VOLI0
:i7 CEDAWand African Charter
:i8 1981 ILM 58 African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights
:ilJ Frans Viljoen 'Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights by Domestic Courts
in Africa' J.A.L. 1999 Vol. 43 @ 1
60 CEDAW was adopted on 18 December 1979 by General Resolution 341180 and the Optional Protocol
was adopted by the Commission on the status of Women
61 Article 2 of the Convention is a statement of the obligations undertaken by the contracting parties
15
"
It aims to achieve a society where women will be treated equally to men and where
oppressive customs and prejudices will be questioned and replaced by egalitarian
forms of behavior.()2 This Convention is not concerned with the formal equality of
women but its focus lies in according women substantive equality.Cl:l Thc provisions
take into account the significant differences in the characteristics and circumstances of
nlen and women so as to avoid unfair, gender- related outcomes. The Convention
denlands from the ratifying states an extensive conlmitnlent to wOlllen's rights.
CA
The
Optional Protocol will allow WOlnen to directly communicate with the committee on
CEDAW when their rights, as defined in CEDAW have been violated. Cl) Non-
govelllmental organizations will also be able to bring reports of violations.()() The
Protocol may be exercised after state remedies have all been exhausted at a national
level, it may also have the added effect of improving domcstic remedies by
encouraging states to give better legal protection to women's issues. ()7
In 1981 African states adopted the African Charter on Hunlan and Peoples Rights
unofficially known as the Banjul Charter.68 This Charter does not specifically address
the issue of women's rights, but rather incorporates them by reference. Article 18 of
the Charter begins by declaring that the family is the "natural unit and basis of society"
Cl.:' Article 2 further enjoins State Parties to abolish or modify existing laws, regulations, practices and
customs which const'itute discrimination against women.
(,3 Formal equality means sameness of trea~ment: The law must treat individuals in the same manner
regardless of their circumstances. Substantive equality takes these circumstances into account and
requires the law to ensure equality of outcome - De Waal et al. Bill (d"RighfS Hand/)()o/.; ([0188
h-lFayeeza Kathree 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women'
SAJHR 1995 ([u 421
65 www. un.org/womenwatch- Article by Natalie Fisher titled' Two new Instruments'
66 Supra note 60 above
(17 Supra note 60 above
68 21 I. L. M. 59 (198 1)
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and enJoll1s states to protect the fall1i ly. It then proclaims that African states " shall
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the
protection of the rights of the woman and child as stipulated in intel11ational
declarations and conventions,,(j(). There has been a growing awareness of the African
Charter during the 1990's70 possibly following the crcation of new domcstic
institutions and the enforcement of constitutional rights as exemplified by the case law
referring to the African Charter.7l Chaloka Beyani72 stresses the importance of using
the sexual equality provisions of the African Charter because he notes that most of the
national constitutions do not include sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination. He
observes furthcr that the African Charter obliges the African Commission to draw
inspiration from the international law of human rights and international human rights
. nIl1stru111cnts. -
The African Charter gives little direct attention to women as a group, although the
drafters were well aware of CEDAWand other n1ajor international human rights
docUlnents. 74
(ll) Winston Langley 'The Rights of Women, The African Charter and The Economic Development of
Africa' 1<)87 Bostoll College Third World Law )ouI'I/al (a)2 IS
70 Frans Viljoen 'Application of the African Charter by Domestic Courts in Africa' 1<)<)<) 1. A. L. Cal) vol.
43
71 See case law discussed below ([I) 18-21
72 Zambian Reseach fellow (a) Wolfson College Oxford - View expressed in 'HUll/Oil Rights alld A/ikoll
WOII/ell ' See note 73 below
7.' In its task of interpreting the Charter, the African Commission is supposed to draw inspiration from
the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration and other instruments adopted by the United
Nations. It is doubtful whether drawing inspiration means that these documents are binding on the
commission or directly applicable to replace a vague Charter provision - In any case even without this
problem Article 18(3) is extremely difficult to interpret. - 'Human Rights and African Women' HUll/ail
Rights Quartel), 1993 Vol IS (£11249
74Supra note 73 above (£11249
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Another limitation of the African Ch'alier is that it couples non-discrimination against
individuals on the one hand with the emphasis on family relations, protection of
cultural valucs and duties of persons to the statc on the other. 75 It is submitted that
these two aspects are highly irreconcilable within the sphere of women's rights.
Some common issues of women's rights can be identified in the reports submitted to
both CEDAWand the African COJllnlission. Most African states parties note in their
reports that discrinlination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional, yet widespread in
their societies where inequalities can be found in every walk of life. It would therefore
appear that their commitment to these documents could be questioned. 7(lUnder
CEDAWand the African Charter, responsibility for enforcemcnt rests with the
ratifying states. However, African leaders emphasize and continue to stress domcstic
sovereignty and not international accountability.77 Therefore the courts would have to
undertake to incorporate intenlational law into the local system.
International law can be incorporated into local legal systems in two ways; by explicit
reference or by reception78 . In countries where the judiciary has credibility and legal
decisions have precedential value, vindication of rights through litigation can be
79 . . xvextremely effective . In the case of Atlorney General vs UnLly DoH' . the plaintiff
75 ibid
7(, ibid
77 Supra note 73 above.
7X Explicit reference entails the enactment by name, as part of domestic legislation and reception entails
when international agreements are reproduced in national legislation or if national legislation is amended
or repealed to conform to international norms - For definition see article in note 66 above
79Geoff Feltoe 'Basic information on the constitutional and legal system of Zimbabwe' Zilllha!Jwe Law
Review ([l) 166
xo 1994 BCLR (6) (fvl
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Unity Dow, was a citizen of Botswana and man'ied to a United States national. The
plaintiff had three children, two of whom were born after Botswana Law was changed
to provide that children born in wedlock are deemed citizens only of their father's
country of nationality. Dow sued to have the nationality law sct aside as ultra vires the
Constitution. She clainled that the law, in denying her the capacity to confer citizenship
rights on her family in the same way that men can confer citizenship on
theirs,discriminated against her because it violated her right to non-discriminatory
protection of the law and to liberty.sl The use of inte111ational human rights norms in
interpreting the Constitution was problematic in this case because Botswana had not
ratified any of the international human rights instruments other than the African
Charter. The court negotiated the difficulty by invoking the incorporation provision in
the African Charter preamble and Botswana's signature of CEDA Wand made
reference to both in the judgment and said that:
"It is difficult if not impossible to accept that Botswana would deliberately
discrinlinate against WOll1en in its legislation whilst at the same time internationally
support non-discrimination against females or a section of them."
The decision was appealed and upheld. Judge Amissah, writing for the majority noted
that in his opinioil:
81 Section 3 (a) of the Constitution of Botswana
19
"Botswana is a member of the community of civi lized states which has undertaken to
abide by certain standards of conduct, and unless it is impossible to do otherwise it
would be wrong for its courts to interpret its legislation in a manner which conflicts
with the International obligations that Botswana has undertaken".x~
As a direct consequence of this case Botswana amended its Citizenship Act.~3
The South African Constitutional Court acknowledged South Africa's obligations in
terms of international human rights law in Thomas vs Minister oJ Home Affairs. ~4 In S
vs Williams85 the leallled judge Langa J said that Article 5 of the African Charter
helped him to substantiate the assertion that section 11 (2) of the interim ,Constitution
corresponds with most international human rights instruments. The Constitutional
Court in Brink vs KitshoJl{j had to consider the constitutionality of section 44 of the
Insurance Act x7which had the effect of declaring a life insurance policy, which had
been ceded by a husband to a wife two years before the estate was sequestrated,
allowed the wife only R30,OOO and the remainder of the insurance policy would fall
into the insolvent estate. The Act discrinlinated against WOlllen because it made no
reference to insurance policies ceded in favor of the husband by the wi fe. In reaching
its decision the court made reference to section 35 (1) of the Constitution that requires
us to have regard to international law to interpret the rights it entrenches, and examined
X2Supra note 80 above ([l1 28
~n Section 4 of the Citizenship Act of 1984 was amended, although the amendment came several years
after the Unity Dow judgement. It is clear from the memorandum accompanying the amendment that it
was adopted in reaction to the judgement. (Memo on Citizenship Amendment Bill no. 9 of 1995 )
8-1 BCLR2000 (8) 837 (CC)
R5 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC)
R6 1996 4 SA Cf~ 217
87 Act 27 of 1943
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the definitions of the concepts of 'equality before the law' and 'discrimination' as
defined in, amongst others the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and CEDA W.
xx
In Zambia, in the case of LonglVe vs Intercontinental Hotels89 where the petitioner had
been refused entry into the bar of the hotel because she was unaccon1panied, the
respondent hotel having adopted a policy of excluding women unaccompanied by men
fron1 entering the bar, the petitioner sued the hotel for damages for unlawful
discrimination citing Article 11 of the Constitution of Zambia. The learned judge
Musumali .1. found that the petitioner had clearly been discriminated against on the
grounds of gender.90 He stated further that in deciding an issue not covered by
domestic legislation, a court should take judicial notice of international treaties and
conventions and referred to the international human rights documents including the
African Charter and CEDAW. 91 The Zanlbian High COl1l1made the following remarks
about Intenlational treaties
"It is my considered VIew that rati fication of such documents by a nation state
without reservations is a clear testimony to the willingness of the state to be bound by
the provisions of such a document. Since there is this willingness and if an issue
comes before this court which would not be covered by local legislation but would be
xx Supra note 86 above.
X9 Longwe vs International Hotels 1993 (4) pg. 221 Commonwealth Law Reports
')()
Idem C£l~ Pg. 232 a-b
91 Idem (f11 Pg. 233 c-d
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covered by such lntenlational documents, I would take judicial notice of the treaty or
convention in my resolution of the dispute.,,92
In the Zimbabwean case of Chirwo vs Registror Genera/c)3 the judicial officer referred
to the African Charter as one of a number of instruments that contain a right to
freedom of movement and travel. In Rattigan al1d Others vs The Chief Immigration
Officer. 94the cou11 looked at international codes guaranteeing protection against
interference with fanlily life and acknowledged that there was no provision in the
Constitution of Zimbabwe equivalent to those provisions, but stated that section 11 of
the Constitution came close by guaranteeing every person "protection for the privacy
of his home"l)S
It can therefore be concluded that the courts of the countries under study have shown
respect for international human rights documents and have nlade reference to them in
their decided cases. It is submitted that even a failed attempt to challenge or change
the law via litigation can be an inlportant step forward and will incremental1y make life
easier for women. When Wambui Otieno of Kenya had lost her claim to bury her
husband's body according to his wishes instead of according to Luo custom, it was a
major legal defeat for Wambui and for women. But the case attracted so much national
lJ2 Idem ({il 222 a-c
'J'
J 1987 Zimbabwea/l Law Reports ([~ 228
94 1995 (1) BCLR (ZS) @ 1
9~-Idem (f/l 2 J
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and international attention that immediately after the appellate decision womcn In
Kcnya began organizing to change the succession law.%
It shou Id be remembered that women's rights begin at home. They cannot be
guaranteed at Geneva or Banjul or Strasburg or Vienna, where international bodies
meet and lobby and craft the premises of intenlational hunlan rights instruments. What
transpires in those centers can only happen because people and organizations at the
local and national level identify the problems, develop the issues and make it known to
the public and policy makers. 97
Trenlendous potential exists for applying inte111ational human rights norms to develop
and improve WOlnen's rights throughout the world. Non discrimination provisions in
laws and constitutions can be invoked to establish women's capacity to function as
individuals and adults in every aspect of their society to enter and dissolve malTiages
freely, and nlake inlportant falnily decisions, to inherit, own and manage personal
prope11y and land and to have the freedolTI to contract and litigate. We will now
examine women's rights in the above areas in the countries under discussion.
96 As discussed in Marsha A Freeman' Women, Law and the Land at the local lel'e/' Human Rights






The rights of wonlen in marriage are central to their rights as individuals, more so in
Southern Africa where extended families predonlinate and marriages are a matter of
lineage concenl. These rights are even more important than in areas where the nuclear
fami Iy prevai Is. The customs of bridewealth, chi Id betrothal, arranged marriages,
bigamy and polygamy, and 'inheritance' of a relative's widow, all of which contravene
the United Nation's provision for Human Rights, are central to the organization of
Southern African societies. Many readers might find these practices abhorrent, yet
these practices are far from abholTent to a society which regards malTiage as an
alliance between lineages, which believes that young people are incapable of making
reasoned decisions with regard to their future spouses, and which wishes to protect
widows by providing them with a new male guardian on the death of their spouses. 9X
It must be noted that the traditional rules that govern matters 0 f fam ily, marriage and
women's rights are not merely historical curiosities, they are part and parcel of the
living domestic law in most African states.l)l)
98Rhoda Howard 'Women's rights in English speaking Sub Saharan Africa' ~l)A6 in (eds) C.E. Welch
Human Rights and Development ill Afi"ica.
l)()Ronald Thandabantu Nhlapo 'International protection of Human Rights and the Family :African
Variations on A cOl11mon Theme' llltematiollal JOllmal qfLaH' alld the Family 1989 Vol. 3 (Cl)}
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All the International documents mentioned herein recognize the special position of the
rami Iy in society. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates
that 'men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to nlaITY and found a family' .100 It goes 011 to recognize that'
they are entitled to 'equal rights as to marriage, during n1aniage and at its dissolution'
and it makes the full and free consent of the intending spouses, a condition of
. 101nlarnage.
Article 23 of the Inten1ational Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 10
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognize the
right to protection of the family by society and contain essentially similar provisions on
maniage as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 102
Article 18 of the African Charter affinlls that 'the family shall be the natural unit and
basis of society' and guarantees its protection by the state. I03 A fundamental
disappointment of the Charter is its failure to mention maniage speci fically. One can
surmise that in the interests of obtaining the widest possible acceptance for the Charter,
the dralters decided to leave the issue of nlalTiage law to the domestic legislation
within each state. 104
lOOS @upra note 101 below (( 7
101 Document reprinted in Winston E Langley Womens Rights in International Documents (1991)
IlP .- Idem(fr) Pg. 8 and 10 respectively.
IlD Supra note 99 above (fu. 13
Ill4 Supra note 99 above {fu. 14
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Article 16 of CEDA WIOS confers on women the same rights as men to enter into
marriage with their full and free consent, to freely choose a spouse and to decide freely
on the number and spacing of their chi Idren. It gocs onc stcp furthcr and awards
women access to the information, education and means to enable- them to exercise
these rights. 106 In addition, it accords husbands and wives the same personal rights,
including the right to choose a fanlily name, a profession and an occupation. 107 Men
and women also have the san1e rights with respect to ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition ofproperty.'ox
In the following countries speci fic case studies we examine how Civi I and Customary
Marriages affect Women's Rights to Equality:
105 Supra note 101 above @') 165-166 - CEDAW Relevant provisions reprinted
10<> Article 16 (a-e)- CEDAW -Ibid
107 Article 16 (g)- CEDA W- Ibid




In Botswana it is traditionally said "Mosodike Ilgwollo \110 mOlllla "- (f \1'0/7/(/11 is (he
child 01 0 171011, meaning that women under Tswana Customary law always had
guardians and wonlen had limited legal capacity although in practice some women are
. I d d' I' . I I . I lOt)more 1l1dependent t lan others epen lI1g on t lelr socla c ass or manta status.
Botswana law recognizes two systems of marriage, that under the Customary laws and
that under the common and statutory laws. Persons wishing to marry must choose
between these two types of marriage. The statutory law provides that one cannot marry
a different person during the subsistence of the marriage, on the other hand the
customary marriage is potentially polygamous.
Under the cust0l11ary regil11e there are two requirell1ents for a valid union. These are
the agreement between the respective spouse's fal11ilies and the transfer of hogadi or
bridewealth. 1lO It is a patriarchal system and the husband is regarded as the head of the
family, and all final decision making powers vest with him. There is also a belief that a
man who has paid the hogodi is allowed to chastise his wi fe and this is used as an
excuse for spousal abuse.'" A wi re under this system lacks locus stolldi ill judicio as
her husband is regarded as her guardian and as such he issues and defends legal suits
IOl}A. Molokomme 'Women's law in Botswana: laws and research needs' in The Legal Sitl/atioll of
Womell ill SOl/them Aji'ica (eds)Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong
110 Idem (a) Pg. 14-15
III d :\I em Ca! Pg. 15
27
on her behalf and IlluSt assist her in entering contracts I 12. When she brings a suit
against her husband she has to be assisted by her parents whoIll rarely assist WOlllen in
taki ng thei r husbands to court. I U
The polyganlous nature of customary malTlages often inflict economIc hardship on
women, and the wife has little or no say in her husband's decision to take another wife.
Even if he does not lnarry another wife his infidelity is tolerated but a wife is
prohibited frOl11 adultery, which constitutes a ground for divorce.
114
There are no
specialized property regimes in customary marnages and the husband owns and
controls all the property of value. A wife has only usufructuary rights.
In the common law of marriage we find that severe restrictions are placed on the legal
status of wonlen. The personal consequences of marriage deny women equal say in
matters of domicile, guardianship of their minor children and decisions affecting the
household in general. These rights seem to belong to the husband. I IS The proprietary
consequences are variable in that the women may choose between marriages in and out
of community of property but both these systems are unsatisfactory. While cOlllmunity
of property is advantageous in that it gives the wife a half share in the joint estate, it
gives the husband sole power of administering that property. During the marriage the
112 Idem (@, Pg. 16
113 Idem ({J! Pg.16
114 Idem @)Pg. 15
"5Athaliah Molokomme 'Marriage - what every woman wants or 'civil death? The status of married
women in Botswana' in WOl1lell alld Law ill Southern Aji'ica (eds) Alice Armstrong and Welshman
Ncube 1987 ~/) 182
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wife has a near minority status and may not enter into contracts with regard to the joint
estate without her husband's consent. I 16
Under the Deeds Registry Act of 1969 immovable property could not be registered in
the name of the wife, and husbands married in community of property could dispose of
the joint property. I 17 Houses and land were usually sold without the wife's permission
and the courts are generally reluctant to interfere. In the case of Moisa/cal1lo vs
Moisakal1l0 118a woman applied for an order restraining her ex-husband from disposing
of the joint property pending the determination of the allocation of property following
their divorce. The high court refused to grant the order on the grounds that litigation
should be of a vindicatory or quasi-vindicatory nature and that the applicant had failed
to show an actual or well-grounded apprehension of in-eparable loss.
The situation has now been atnended and the Deeds Registry Act of 1998119 provides
that in nlaniages in COnl1TIlll1ity of property neither spouse can alienate the immovable
property of the joint estate without the other's written consent. From 1996 women
married in community of property are pel111itted to own immovable property in their
own name but their husbands still retain considerable control over the joint assets. 120 It
is submitted that these changes are purely cosmetic and do not change the actual
116 Idem @ Pg. 182-185
117 Supra note 109 above @ Pg. 17





prejudice suffered by women under the husband's marital power, and neither does it
abolish it. 121
The women who choose to marry out of community of property are not in any better
position. Although they have full legal capacity to contract and acquire property, it
disadvantages women who do not have an independent income, like housewives, who
usually leave the man-iage enlpty handed.
Divorce
Grounds for divorce under customary law are different for men and women; a husband
can divorce a wife for infidelity, barrenness, repeated adultery, sorcery, refusal to
perform household chores, and other traditionally viewed fonlls of insubordination on
the part of the wife. 122 The wife cannot divorce the husband on the grounds of
infidelity and cruelty unless his behavior is excessive. 123 However, it is generally
accepted that women are expected to 'persevere in the face of difficulty' and divorce is
more di fficult to obtain. 124 Irretrievable breakdown is considered a ground of divorce
but only if one or more of the abovementioned grounds are present. 125
12\ http:www freedom in the world.! Botswana.htm It was reported that women's rights are not fully
respected in Botswana and made particular reference to the fact that a married woman cannot take a
bank loan without her husband's consent.





On divorce the husband usually ends up with all of the property and the children. The
elders usually request that the bridewealth be returned and in many cases have refused
to hand over the chi ldren to the wi fe, once custody has been granted to her, unti I the
payment of the bridewealth. 12 ()
In the unreported case of lane M%leate and Isaac Mofokate l27 where the wife wished
to have the customary union dissolved on the legal grounds provided by the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 the High Court ruled that traditional marriages are
best dealt with by the traditional courts. It held that the provisions of the above Act do
not apply to customary unions, and averred that divorces under customary marriages
must be based on the customary rules of law which apply to that particular tribe to
which the parties belong, although under section 95 of the Constitution of Botswana,
the High Court is con1petent to hear and determine any matter, under any law.
The sole ground on which an action for divorce can be brought under Statute law is
that the malTiage has broken down irretrievably. Section 15 of the Matrilllonial Causes
Act of 1973 provides for factors to prove such breakdown. The grounds for divorce,
which apply to customary and statutory marriages respectively, are not interchangeable
between the two systems and problems arise in cases where parties are married under
both systems. .
116- Supra note 109 above @ 21
In Unreported (4 December 2000)-http:/www.afrolgenderprofiles.co.za- Transcript on file with Author
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It is submitted that the court's reluctance to dissolve a customary ul110n USlllg the
statutory law unfairly discriminates against women, as this is the more equitable option
for wives.
It is apparent fronl the above discussion of marriage and divorce that customary norms
are predominantly responsible for the unequal relationship between spouses III
Botswana. In the Unity Dow case the learned judge Bizos JA said that:
"The customs, traditions and culture of a society must be bonle in mind and afforded
due respect, but they could not prevail when they conflict with the express provisions
f I . .." 128o t le constItutIon .
It is submitted that this is the attitude that will facilitate change in Botswana.
The situation of nlarried wonlen in Botswana is precanous. In spite of recent
publications of the Unity Dow case, 129 which catapulted the position of nlarried women
in Botswana into the intenlational arena, although the cOUlis nlentioned respect for the
intenlational right to equality, and the obligations under inte111ational treaties that
advocate for equality between spouses, much work still needs to be done on married
women's rights in Botswana.
128 1994 BCLR (6) @1




Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 contains no
express provision protecting the right to family life or to marriage per se, such rights
are in fact protected through the provisions conce111ing human dignity. In Thomas and
Another vs Minister of flome Affairs and others 130 it was stated that ITIal1~iage and the
falni1y are social institutions of vital in1portance. It was further acknowledged that the
right to dignity was the n10st specific right that protected individuals who wished to
enter into and sustain a pe1111anent relationship. The court declared that any legislation
which prohibited the establishment of such a relationship would "clearly constitute an
infringement of the right to dignity". 131
The right to equality is pren1ised on the idea that every person possesses equal human
dignity and unfair discrimination on the grounds of personal attributes, denies
recognition of the very attribute that is COlTIITIOn and equal to all, namely human
d· . 132Iglllty. -
DO 2000 (8) BCLR 837 CC/2000 (3) SA 936CC- The Applicants in this case were spouses one of whom
was a South African and the other an alien who sought an immigration permit to settle in SA. They
successfully argued that ss25 (9) (b) of the Aliens Control Act 96 o'f 1991 denied spouses the right to
cohabit and therefore infringed their rights inter alia to dignity.
131 Saber Ahmed Jazbhay 'Right to marry and family life' De Reblls October 2000 (si) 56
132 De Waal et al The Bill ofRights Handbook @210(2000) -
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Prior to 1994, the customary law of marriage was unstable as was reflected in the case
of fSl7lOiI vs ]sl11ail 133 where the court found that it could not recognize customary
unions because it entailed the recognition of polygamy, which was contrary to public
I· \.1-+po ICY.
The public policy debate was once again revisited in the case of Rylalld vs Edros
135
which involved the recognition of muslim nlarriages. 13()The plaintiff married the
defendant, his wife, by lTIusliln rites, and instituted action for her eviction from the
marital hOllle. The wife founded her claim on what she alleged were the 'contractual
agreements' constituted by the marriage by muslim rites between the parties.
137
The court held that the continued refusal to recognize muslim marriages would violate
the principle of equality between groups and a court should only brand a contract as
offensive to public policy if it were offensive to those values which were shared by the
comnlunity at large and not only by one section of it. 138 It was further stated that
recognition of potentially polygamous marriages and enforcement of the contractual
relationships arising fron1 them are no longer per se contrary to public policy.139
In November 1996 the South African Law Commission proposed that the customary
and civi I law of marriage be harmonized and that the discriminatory elements in both
133 1983 (1) SALR 1006 (A)
13~ The effect of the public policy proviso was to subjugate customary law and ensure that it always
remained subordinate to civil law.
135 1997 CO/JIlllOlIlI'ea/th Lall' Reports pg. 70/1997 BCLR (it?77 (CC)
13h Which in South Africa have suffered a history of even greater prejudice than customary marriages.
137 ({i] pg. 70 e-g
138 Supra note 135 above @ Pg. 78 h-i
139 Per curiam (f~ 71 e-g The same principle did not necessarily apply to marriages which were actually
polygamous.
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be removed. l .w It also acknowledged the distinction between the official and the living
versions of customary law. In keeping with this, the court in lv/a!Jella vs Letsoalol.'+1
applied a 'living' system of law whereby the groom could negotiate bridewealth
directly with his prospective wife's mother. 142 This new gender-neutral custom was
held to be consonant with the 'spirit, purport, and objects' of the fundamental rights.
14J
With the Recognition ofCustomary Marriages Act 120 of1998 women who choose to
marry under customary law are protected. The Act also gives effective recognition to
all existing customary mal1~iages.14.'+ It provides that both the parties must be over 18
and consent to be 111arried and that the marriage must be entered into or negotiated in
accordance with customary law. 145Further, it does not expressly require the payment of
lobola or bridewealth and provides for the registration of customary marriages and
I d . I I . . d 146P aces a statutory uty on partIes to 1ave t le nlarnages reglstere .
The most contentious issue of the Act is that it provides for polygamy and recognizes
that a man l11ay marry as 111any wOll1ell as he wishes. The Act also recognises that if a
person has entered into more than one customary law ll1atTiage, all valid marriages
I·W Titled the Harmonisation of the common law and the indigenous law - Discussion Paper 74 August
1997
1-11 1998 (2) SA.L.R.I068 (T)
I-I~ According to the standard version of customary law bridewealth agreement requires the consent of
the brides and grooms guardians and is usually negotiated between the families.
'.DT. W. Bennett 'Human Rights and A/i'icoll Custumwy Lllll" @~ 188 (1999)
1-1-1 Section 2( 1) of the Act -This long awaited provision sought not only to remove the anomalies caused
by the refusal to countenance potentially polygynous unions as proper marriages but also to comply with
the constitutional guarantees of culture and equal treatment.
145 Section 3( 1)b of the Act
1-16 Section 4 of the Act - Section 4(3) (a) provides that if an existing customary is not already registered
spouses must do so within 12 months after the commencement of the act. Failure to comply will not
affect the validity of the union.
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. . d 1...17 0 f I .entered IlltO before the commencement of the Act are recoglllze . ne 0 t le maIll
reasons for recognizing polygamy was the fact that prohibition would be impossible
. hi' 14R I tl t 'and wI\'es must consent to t e po ygamous unIons. t seems la some women s
rights are being protected at the expense of others, because it was argued that if one
bans polygamy altogether, then nlen will enter into informal unions and those women
will be prejudiced thereby.149 Section 7(6) of the Act provides that if a man wishes to
enter into a further cust0111ary union he nlust nlake an application to the High COUl1 for
a contract to regulate the proprietary consequences thereof and that all present and
. b .. d d 1'\0prospectIve spouses must e JOIlle as respon ents...
Parties who are married under customary law may l11arry each other civi Ily but
spouses who are married civilly cannot, during the subsistence of the marriage, enter
. 1 . 1'\1Into any ot ler marnage...
All civil marriages in South Africa after November 1984 are in community of property,
unless the parties sign an ante nuptial contract either with the provision of accrual or
without. All custolllary marriages entered into after the commencement of the Act are
automatically in community of property unless the parties enter an ante nuptial
contract. The provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act, 152 which applies to civi I law
I·P Section 2(3) of the Act
14H With the exception of the first wife.
149 Argument stated in the Law Commissions Discussion paper.
ISU Sec 7(6)-7(9) of the Act -(the costs involved herein would be extensive) Further each spouse and the
relevant registrar of deeds must be furnished with a certified copy of the court approved contract.
\SI, An Analysis of the South African Experience in passing Legislation Recognising Customary
Marriages'- unreported paper (Transcript on file with author) obtained from the Legal Resources Ce/llre-
Cape Town.
IS2 Act No. 88 of 1984
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marriages, also apply to customary malTiages. '53 This wi 11 make the position of women
married under custonlary unions easier, as they will have the same rights accorded to
them as women maITied under the civil law.
Women in customary unions entered into before the commencenlent of the Act 154 have
full status and capacity but are still subject to the matrinlonial property system under
custon1ary law,155 which is vague and unclear on the rules and vests control of the
marital estate in the husband. According to the Law COlllmission's discussion paper,
the reason that marriages entered into before the comlnencement of the Act could not
be in community of property was because of their polygamous nature. The result of the
application of the new regime to these cases would be to make the legal position of
spouses very difficult to determine. The Act has made a change to women's rights yet
sonle things have remained the sanle.
In the landnlark case of Prior vs Battle and Others 156 the issue of the husbands' marital
power was finally laid to rest. The applicant in this case averred that sections 37 and
39(2) (ii) of the Marriage Act l57 violated the fundamental rights entrenched in the
constitution and that the nlarital power of the husband is anachronistic.
The applicant stated that she should not be bound by the restrictions arIslIlg from
marital power which the Act inlposed. Her husband did not oppose the application but
153Yictoria Bronstein 'Confronting Custom in the New South African State' SAJHR(2000) YOL16
@558
154 The Recognition Act was passed and assented to in 1998 but only came into effect in November 2000
I ~~-- Sec (6) of the Act
156 1999(2) SA LR 850 (Transkei)
157 Act 21 of 1978-passed by the Parliament of the then Transkei homeland
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seven other respondents intervened and they submitted that the Act codified customary
law and that therefore the marital power that the Act dealt with was inseparable from
the power as understood in customary law. They submitted further that the termination
of the marital power in civil marriages between white persons did not justify its
termination in civil lUatTiages between black persons. The marital power was seen by
the court to violate the fundan1ental rights entrenched in the Constitution and as a
violation of the right to dignity. The court stated that this further constituted unfair
discrinlination on the grounds of gender. According to Miller J :
"There is no logical or rational basis to conclude that the male partner in a civil
malTiage must have more rights than the female partner and must have control over
the fen1ale partner simply because he is male."
The applicant was declared to be free of her husband's guardianship and marital
power. 158
Divorce
According to customary law, divorce is a private affair involving only the fan1ilies of
I"()the spollses - .
Prior to the conin1encement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No 120 of
1998, custonlary 111arriages were tenuinated outside the forn1al legal system and did
158 Harry Barker 'Marital power and Ancient Law' De ReIms October 1999 0) 41
159 Customary law was essentially uncodified and divorces were llssually a pri~ate affair handled by the
families of the spouses.
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d· 'b' f I . I I()()make provIsIon for maintenance or the Istn utlon 0 t le manta estate.
Furthellllore, a woman had to be aided by her guardian to procure a divorce and there
. . I (l I dd" b I I I d I .were no specIfic grounds for the dIvorce. In a Itlon ecause s le ac <e o('[tS
standi, the woman was at her guardian's whim. If he could not or would not return the
bridewealth there was every chance that he would not assist her. I ()2 The courts were
prepared to hold a father liable for the support of his children, but they have yet to give
a ruling on the nlaintenance of fonner spouses. 163 Customary law had no concept of
alimony.l64 Therefore an aggrieved spouse had no means of obtaining any
compensation if her husband had an affair.
Now customary nlarriages nlay only be dissolved by a court l65 and can be dissolved
the same way as civil divorces, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This
requirenlent will be satisfied if the court finds that the nlarriage has reached such a
state of disintegration that there is no reasonable prospect of the restoration of the
normal maniage relationship between the parties. 166 The Act also makes provision for
other legislation that regulate civil marria~es to be applicable to customary unIons,
IhO Because customary law was essentially uncodified and because divorces were usually a private affair
handled by the families of the spouses.
lell Like irretrievable breakdown and adultery, which are usually cited as grounds for divorce in civil
marriages. In certairi groups because of the polygamous nature of their marriages adultery is not
considered a ground for divorce.
162 Supra note 158 above
IC1]T. W. Bennett 'Hll11/al/ rights al/d A.!i·ical/ CllSt011/W)' La\\,'
164 Ibid
165 Section 8 (1) of the Act- This would be beneficial in two ways; women could not be prevented from
suing for divorce and the courts would be in a position to apply all the safeguards designed to protect
wives and children, such as the rules on equitable division of marital estates, post divorce maintenance,
custody and guardianship.
16C1 Section 8(2) of the Act
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such as The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act!(17 and the intervention of the
family advocate where minor children are involved. Section 8(4) of the Act states that
in granting the Di vorce Order 'the court has the same power as in sections 7-10 0f the
Divorce Act No 70 of 1979. These provisions give the court powers to order a division
of assets, maintenance, the recission, variation or suspension of orders of maintenance,
custody and guardianship, a forfeiture of benefits and the costs of a divorce action.
Further the courts n1ay also order the assets of one party be transferred to the other. 168
The discretionary nature of the court's power to make n10st of these orders permits the
, . 1 b l' bl '(ll)accon1modatlOn of whatever customary ru es may e app lca e.
In polygamous n1arriages the court may take any contract into account that regulates
the rights of the spouses but in doing so it n1ust make an equitable order 170and any
person who has sufficient interest in the matter can be joined in the proceedings 171.
The judicial discretion to redistribute assets equitably on divorce has been incorporated
into the Act and would be a useful tool to assist women in circun1stances where the
parties have sonle property. 172 It is arguable that section 8 (4) of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act does not extend the judicial discretion to customary
divorces, as it does not simply incorporate or apply the sections of the Divorce Act but
rather gives the court the powers contemplated under the incorporated sections.' n
167 Act 24 of 1987
168 Section 8 (4) e of the Act is explicit about the inclusion of customary law in regard to maintenance.
169T.W. Bennett Human rights and African CUsf011lmy Law @ 203
170 Sec8 (4) b of the Act
17\ Ibid
172 Section 8 (4) of the Act
InYictoria Bronstein' Confronting custom in the new South African state'SAJH.R(2000)Yol 16 rf..iJ,573
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Section 39 (2) of the Constitution enJ01l1s us to interpret legislation In a way that
coheres with the Bill of Rights. It is submitted that a judicial discretion to redistribute
property on divorce fits better with the Constitution. 174 Cultural arguments about the
inviolability of custonlary property rights would carry little weight in circumstances
where a wife has contributed to the estate that she is seeking to share. 175 There is also
evidence that living customary law is adapting to accommodate more equitable
proprietary alTangenlents on divorce and there are a number of reasons why the judicial
discretion is a good institution for custOlnary law divorces. 176 First the discretion can
be fine-tuned to deal with the circumstances of individual cases and second it would
apply to divorces that take place after the Act comes into force and any orders would
b
. 177e prospectIve.
In light of the Recognition of Custonlary Marriages Act it can be concluded that South
Africa has attempted to challenge the obstacles placed on women by customary law.
However, one of the nlajor obstacles to the Act is that it fails to address the situation of
women married before the conlnlencement of the ACt. 178 It is submitted that in these
cases and others that fall outside the a111bit of the Act, the equality clause of the




177 Supra note 173 above @ 572
178 Supra note 173 above @ 574
41
It must be remembered when interpreting the Act that one of the tasks of the Special
Project Committee 179 was to reconcile the customary law of marriage with the Bill of
Rights and the various international conventions ratified by South Africa, one of which




Most of the gender inequalities that exist In traditional society stemmed from the
African concept of marriage. Swaziland recognizes both civil and customary law
marriages.l~1 The consequences of a civil marriage are divided into those that cannot
be excluded by ante nuptial contract and those that can. 182 The former includes
essential aspects of Inarriage, such as the inevitable change of status, as well as the
duty to live together and provide each other with Inaterial and 1110ral support. 183
The status of a manied woman depends upon whether her marriage is with or without
the marital power, and whether it is in or out of community of property. I ~4
17') The Special Project ConU11ittee was charged with ensuring recognition of customary marriages and
initiating a through-going reform of the customary law governing marital relations. The result was the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.
IMO Amongst others - see Human Rights and African Customary Law - T. W. Bennett ADDENDUM ([l)
193
181 R.T Nhlapo 'The Legal Situation of Women in Swaziland' (eds) Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong
in The Legal Situation of Women in Southern Af;'ica @ 97 (/991) ,




Marriage out of community of property and without the marital power leaves the wi fe
in the position of a single woman with full contractual and proprietary capacity and full
personal autonomy.IX5 The husband retains only his rights as head of the family and
has a decisive say in matters concenling the family life of the spouses. IX6 The most
disadvantageous legal position is that of the wife who is married in community of
property with the husbands' marital power. She has no locus standi ill judicio, and has
no contractual capacity and very little control over the joint property of the malTiage. 187
The Marriage Act /88 provides in sections 24 and 25 that in a civil marriage between
Africans, the consequences in relation to marital power shall be in accordance with
custonlary law, unless the parties opt out of this procedure. Most parties are not aware
of these provisions and discover with shock that the customary law has been imported
into their civil malTiage. The brunt of this is usually borne by the wi fe, who usually
only discovers this at the end of the marriage. 189
The nlarital power of the customary Ul110n IS all enconlpasslllg. Because of its
patriarchal nature, the wife is reduced to 'one of the children' and this has obvious
implications for her personal autonomy as well as for human rights issues.Il)() An
illustration of this is that most of the hospitals in Swaziland require a woman to prove
185 Ibid
18(, Ibid
187Supra note 181 above
188 No 47 of 1964 - This Act is a mix of Swazi Customary Law, Roman Dutch Law, and some
innovations and modern trends regarding the conditions and ceremonies of Marriage. As described by
R.S.Bhalla 'Some Reflections of Swaziland's Marriage Act' 1964 SAU 1994 !cv 542
189 ~,
Supra note 181 above C£y Pg 115
19U Ibid
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that she has her husband's permission before she can receive nledical attention.'t)1 That
an adult woman is required to get permission before attending to the needs of her own
,body is a violation 0 f her right to sel f respect and liberty.
Problems of customary nlarriages are many and girls are generally married around the
age of puberty. 192 Their consent is not required, as it is an alTangement between the
parties' fanlilies. 193 Bigalny although unlawful under the MalTiage Act, is allowed
under custonlary law and the MalTiage Act Inakes it clear that civil marriages are
monogamous and cannot co-exist with another marriage, whether civil or customary.It)4
There is a l11isconception that it is acceptable to conclude a marriage in terms of the
Swazi custom and one in terms of the civil law, as most people believe that it is only
two civil nlalTiages to two different people that is prohibited. As a result, the parties
conclude what is tel111ed a dual nlalTiage, which creates a legal anomaly.19S In the case
. ·196ofDIad/a vs Dlamllll the court stated that:
"A nlarnage 111 terms of Swazi law and custom is not dissolved by a subsequent
marriage in terms of the statute law. The custonlary law marriage is a valid marriage
contract when entered into and there is no law which provides for its dissolution
when it is followed by a civil rights malTiage. The two marriage contracts are not
191Katarina Tomsevski 'Women and Human Rights' Women und Law Development Series (1995) (iD 65
19) S- upra note 181 above @ Pg 109
19-' Ibid
194 S @'upra note 181 above (/ 111 and SectIOns 7( 1) &(2) of the Marriage Act No. 47 of 1964
11.)-
) Supra note 181 above @ 111
1% 1977-1978 Swaziland's Law Reports 15 @ 16-17
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mutually destructive and can stand side by side. Where howevcr there is a conflict
betwecn them with regard to the conscquences of marriage it has been held in this
court in Khoza vs Malal1lbe 1970-1976 SLR 380 ... that the law of the land applicable




This situation of conflict between the civil ll1aITiage and the Swazi cust0111ary maniage
is acute in cases of divorce. The grounds of divorce under the Act are considerably
different fr0111 the grounds of divorce under Swazi 'customary law. 19x Under Swazi
customary law a man can divorce his wi fe for a number of reasons namely: adultery,
balTenncss, witchcraft and gross disobedience. Because the marriage is always
potentially polygamous, the wife cannot divorce her husband on the ground of his
adultery as he is entitled to go courting because he can at any tinle decide to take
another wife. This illustrates the inequality of the spouses in a customary union. 199
A civil malTiage can be dissolved by death or divorce, and the parties thereafter revert
. I JooA I .. . d bto Sll1g c status.~ party w lose marnage IS termll1ate efore he or she reaches the
age of21, does not lose the majority status conferred by marriage. 20'
197R.S.Bhalla 'Some Reflections on the Swaziland Marriage Act' 1964 SALJ 1994 Vol. 111 'cD 542198 .... ~.'
Supra note 197 above @ 546
199Ronald Thandabantu Nhlapo 'International protection of Human Rights and the Family: African
Variations of a ConU110n Theme' International Journal vfLaw and the Fa/1/ill' 1989 Vol 3 ~l) 1
'00 J
- Supra note 181 above @ 116 .
20\ Ibid
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UncleI' Roman Dutch Common law there are only two grounds for divorce, VIZ,
adultery and malicious desertion. 202 Swaziland's divorce laws have not adopted the
approach of consensual divorce based on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage
principle. Because of its conservative adherence to the 'guilt' principle Roman Dutch
Common Law requires that one party should breach a fundamental obligation of the
InalTiage before divorce can be granted.203 Adultery would be one such breach.
In the words ofFannin "Divorce is extremely difficult to obtain amongst the Swazi.,,204
Those who claim that there is no divorce in Swazi customary law cite the fact that a
Swazi wife once smeared with "red ochre,,205 remains obligated to perform certain
functions at the husband's hOlne for the rest of her life. In R vs Faklldze20() a court in
Swaziland decided that the custom whereby red ochre is smeared on the women's face
was the point at which a valid customary nlalTiage came into existence. The most
dramatic obligation arising out of this is the requirement that she come back to morn
hinl as his widow on his death for as long as custonl dictates. 207 It does not matter if
she has subsequently relllalTied. 208 There have been incidences where the W0111en are
202 Ibid
20.' Ibid
~()4 J.Fannin 'Preliminary notes on principles of Swazi customary law'(lozitha, unpub, 1967)
_05 A Swazi tradition where the wife is smeared with red ochre by the family of the groom when she
visits her boyfriend before they are married, signifying that she is a wife (known as libovu.) the consent
of the women not usually required and in some cases girls have been forcibly smeared with the ochre
when visiting her lovers home at night, with no inkling that she was to be married.
206 1970 Swaziland Law Reports @422
J07
- Supra note 181 above @ 117
20X Ibid
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forcibly taken to the home of the deceased to observe this tradition. 20 t) Strangely if she
did not have children with the deceased she is usually left alone.
2lo
If a woman wishes to remarry, her family must accept lohol021/from her new husband
and take the lobolo paid by the first husband back to him. The new husband does not
,,212 I' I' , I'!".' )1'get the "red ochre cerenlony, as t liS can occur on y once 111 a woman s Iletlme. - -
In customary unions there is no provision nlade for maintenance for the wife. However
the MaintenClllce Act No 35 of 1970 provides for the 11laintenance of children.
214
The
main problem with this Act is that it has failed to bridge the culture gap. Customary
practices keep intruding on the statutory efforts to modernize maintenance proceedings
with the excuse that it is being done the customary way.215
On divorce the civil law wife retains very little property of value depending on the
Inarital regin1e that she falls under, the n10st beneficial being out of comn1unity of
216 W' d I .property. Ives un er t le custon1ary ul1lons are not so fortunate due to the
patrilineal nature of Swazi tradition. She is not entitled to acquire land and therefore
all she usually retains are minor personal items and the cattle she acquired on the
209 1bid
210 Ibid
211 Bride price -paid by the husband to the bride's family - the marriage is valid even if lobolo does not
change hands but it must at least be negotiated and guarantees given as to the mode of payment received
212 Supra note 200 above
213 R.T. Nhlapo'The legal situation of women in Swaziland' The Legal Situation q{ Women in Southern
Afi'ica (1991) @118
114- Idem ([l) 120
215 Ibid
11() S b ~- upra note 197 a ove ~~ 549
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marnage of her daughters. 217 A customary wife has limited access to wealth
" I Id" 218generatlllg property 10 ll1gs.
From the above discussion of marriage and divorce, it can be concluded that the
situation of the women in Swaziland needs to be inlproved. Most of the formalities
and consequences of nlatTiages, especially customary marriages, indicate
discrinlination against wonlen and violates the provisions of the various international
documents that advocate for equality between the sexes. The fact that the constitution
has been suspended could perhaps be a reason for this situation. However, the lack of
impact of international instruments and treaties in Swaziland indicates the
impossibility of customary laws being challenged on the basis of the country's
international comnlitments. 21 l) In the absence of a Bill of Rights, or any other
constitutional docunlent against which laws and practices can be tested, the
legislature and the cOUlis renlain the only sources of redress. 22o Another cause for
concern is that there is a 'serious lack of data on women in Swaziland' ,221 as work of
a purely legal nature began only recently and is consequently sti II relatively scanty.222
117 Thandabantu Nhlapo 'Law and Culture: Ownership of Freehold Land in Swaziland' ~iJ, 40-45 in
Women and Law in Southern Africa (eds) Alice Armstrong and Welshman Ncube
118 Ibid
J 19
- Supra note 213 above @ 132
JJO
-- Supra note 213 above @ 132
121 This view has been expressed by Armstrong and Russell, in 'A situation Analysis of Women in
Swaziland' in The Legal Situation of Women in Sl\Ia~iland (1991)(eds)J.Stewart A.Armstrono
JJJ :;,




In Zambia during bridal showers the older wonlen usually bid the bride to be
.. Welcome to the Shipikisha club '. Shipikisha is a Bemba22 .1 word meanlllg
"perseverance". This indicates the married women's plight in Zambia.
224
In Zanlbia, like all the other Southenl African states, both the civi I and custOlnary laws
regulate marriage. The status of wonlen in malTiage is deternlined by the type of
malTiage they contract. 225 Women in customary law malTiages in Zambia have been
known to suffer untold hardships of wife beatings, property grabbing and general
mistreatment by the kin of her husband. 226 The local courts administer the customary
laws under which most of the rural Africans contract. 227 The wi re is regarded as a
nlinor and nlust obtain the consent of her fanlily to contract a valid customary
nlalTiage. 228 Paynlent of the bride price also results in her being regarded as property
and undemlines her position as an individua1.229 The bride price is paid to her parents
and if they are not happy they will not consent to the nlarriage. This discriminates
against women by denying them the right to many men of their own choice.no
:m One or the ethnic tribes in Zambia
~~~ Felicia .Sekala Violence against women ~n Southern Africa - Gender in Southern ;(ji'ica 19Y8~iJ,27
--- C.N. l-llmonga, K.A. Turner, C.S Beyalll 'An outline of the Legal status of women in Zambia' in Tire
Legal Situation of Women in Southern Afi'ica (eds) - Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong (1991 )~l), 139
226 Ibid '
1J7
-- Supra note 225 above @ 139
1J8
-- Supra note 225 above @ 149
229 Ibid




This type of regime is polygamous and the husband does not require the consent of his
other wi fe or wives to remarry. As a result of this a wi fe has no right of action against a
woman who commits adultery with her husband, but a husband can claim for damages
for adultery committed by the wife. 231 This inequality as to a woman's right to
consortium is highly unsatisfactory.
There is no systenl of compulsory registration of custOlnary lnarriages and a custonlary
union could come into existence if the parties observe their communities' requirements
governing capacity, consent, bridewealth, mode of celebration etc. 232Nevertheless, the
local courts, particularly in the towns, do exercise a measure of control over the
r . f . 23",lormatlon 0 customary marnages. -
Under the civil law a wonlan needs to be 21 years of age to contract a marriage without
the consent of her parents or guardians. The nlarriage is regulated by the Marriage
Act234 which grants wonlen equal rights of consortiunl and this regime is essentially
235 N . I . .hid .nlonoganlOUS. elt ler spouse lnay contract a marnage WIt anot ler person unng
the subsistence of this marriage. 23 () Wonlen retain their right to personal liberty and
enjoy a relatively high marital status. 237 In a decided case it was stated, "The shackles
23\ Francis Mwangala Zaloumis Paper Presented at Namibian workshop - 'Approaches to Gender
Equality under Customary Law' Transcript on file with author-Obtained from the Legol Resources
Centre- Cope Town
232Simon Coldhal11 'Customary Marriage under the Local Courts in Zambia' Jourl/ol q/A.li"icol1 Lml' ([I)
67
233 Ibid ~} Pg. 67
234 Marriage Act (Ordinance) No. 48 of 1963
235 Supra note 225 above @ 150
23(lIbid
237 Supra note 225 above 0) 151
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of servitude fell from the limbs of married women and they are free to come and go at
I . '11" 711\t lelr own WI .-'
Any person who concludes two marriages, a civil one and a customary union may not
be charged with biganly as discussed in the case of People vs Kalongo:!39. Here the
accused had entered into a custonlary union with 'C'. The couple lived together unti I
they converted their custonlary 111alTiage into a statutory nlarriage in 1969. In January
1974 the accused and'S' had entered into a customary nlaITiage. 'S' had confi ll11ed
that he entered into this union and a certificate of registration had been produced. The
accused was charged with biganly contrary to section 166 of the penal code. The court
held that to constitute the offence of bigamy under section 166 of the pcnal code, the
second marriage nlust be one capable of producing a valid marriage known and
recognised by the law, but for the subsisting nlarriage, and that both the first and
second cerelllonies should be christian or westenl type nlarriages. It also held that for
the purposes of the bigamy offence, a customary nlaITiage is not capable of being a
valid maITiage in the sense intended under the MalTiage Act. 24o
There is another type of "marriage" in Zambia that is not usually discussed. This IS
where a widowed woman IS given a husband against her wil1. 2-l 1 This practice IS
238 Place vs Sew'le (1932) 2 KB 497, 500-1 As quoted in An Outline of The Legal Status of Women in
Zambia- Supra note 225 above.
P<)
_.' 1974 Zambian Law Reports @ 290
240Muna Ndulo 'Widows under Zambian Customary Law and the Response of the Courts' CILSA 1995
Vo!. 18 . ,.
J41 K . . I- nowll as Levirate Marnages - W lere another male from the deceased's family may be appointed to
stand in the footprints of the deceased and discharge in relation to the widow and her' children all the
functions of a husband and father.
. ,,'
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believed to protect the widow so that she and her children are not left destitute upon
her husband's death. The man who she is given to is usually her late husband's brother
or cousin. This practice is extremely humiliating for the women.
Divorce
Customary ll1arnages can be dissolved out of court in accordance with customary
law. 242 In customary law, divorce depends a great deal on the bride price, as it must be
repaid to the husband by the woman's family on the dissolution of the nlarriage.
24
:1
This means that a woman has to again seek her parent's permission before she
dissolves her malTiage.244This discriminates against women in denying them the right
to ternlinate marriages in their own right. There is a growing practice among young
women in nlaniage to raise the bride price herself to initiate her own divorce, literally
'buying' her way out. Howev~r, this situation usually results in her family and spouse
refusing to accept the 111arriage as over as the custoll1ary union is a contract between
the wife's parents as well as between the spouses. 245
In recent years, the local customary courts have acquired much greater control over the
formation and dissolution of cust0l11ary marriages. 24() Their authority to issue marriage
~4~ Simon Coldham 'Customary Marriages and the Urban Local Courts in Zambia' Journal o/Aji-icall
La)\! 1986 ~) 67
~-n Supra note 225 ~u, 149
244lbid
244Chuma Himonga 'Property Disputes in Law and Practice' in Women alld Lall' ill Southern A.fi'ica
(eds) Alice Armstrong and Welshman Ncube @ 58
J4'- - Supra note 225 above @i 150
J46S- upra note 242 above
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certificates has enabled them to lay down the mll1lmUm requirements of a valid
. 247 HIt . d t I r Icustomary marriage. owever, t lese cour s are not requI re 0 ma <e 10rma
decisions about bridewealth, property and custody as they consider these matters to be
settled by the fanlilies of the parties concerned. 248
On divorce the wonlan is entitled to all her property but not that of her husband
249
. The
position of divorced WOl1len was considered by the High court in the case of Mwiya_vs
M\;viya. 25o In this case the parties were malTied under lozi customary law and divorced
in a local court where the wife made a claim for maintenance and a share in his
property. The evidence led was that the property was acquired by the husband during
the subsistence of the maITiage, but with no financial help from the wife. The court
rejected both claims. On appeal to the high court, where the appeal was dismissed, the
court held that there was no lozi custom that cOlnpelled a man to support his divorced
.fi I I . . I I 251Wl e or to s lare lIS prope11y WIt 1 ler.
Lately, the local co1ll1s see111 to recognize the hardships of customary law on women
and have attenlpted to anleliorate the position of women and orders of compensation
on divorce are usually made against husbands in favour of divorced wives252 . In
Be/?!ami Sha\'Va v Mary Zlflu253 , the wife comnlenced proceedings for divorce on the
'47- Supra note 242 above
'48- Supra note 242 @ 67
149- Supra note 244 above @ 59
250 1977 Zambial/ Law Reports @113
251 The decision in the MW1J'([ case seems to represent the general traditional customary law position in
all tribes of Zambia as regards the non- existence of the rights to maintenance and property of women at
divorce.( The Lozi is one such tribe.)
252 Supra note 244 above @ 62
25:> LeA 29/1981
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grounds that her husband evicted her from the marital home. On granting the divorce
the court ordered the husband to pay K1000 as compensation to his wi fe on the ground
that he 'no longer loved her after she had suffered accumulating wealth for him during
the marriage.'
Local court justices have explained that c0111pensation is designed to compensate a
wife for her 'services' rendered during the nlarnage and to provide financial
rehabilitation.254 It is sub111itted that in n10st of the cases where the court ordered
compensation to the wife the amounts were minimal and further the idea of
compensation for 'services' provided does not even come close to recognizing the non
financial contributions of women to family property. In the recent case of Edllo
Mwachisanga vs Zimba 255 the plaintiff clain1ed that the sn1all-holding, the family
owned and the investn1ent on it was purchased through resources of them both. The
wife claimed that she had contributed to the purchase of the ten-acre plot and at
weekends had helped in the construction of the falnily home. The court held that the
wife should be compensated for her contribution in the purchase of the property and
whatever she had spent on the construction of the house. It is interesting to note that,
although they were married for 15 years, the compensation was made without interest.
Women are not usually granted con1pensation if they are guilty of certain ll1atrimonial
offences such as adultery.
':;4-- Supra note 225 above rs..v 153
255 1999 Llfsa!<a Local COlfrt - Transcript on file with author -See note 225 above
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There has been limited changes in some urban areas in property regimes after divorce
as some local courts have granted joint ownership of property during the marriage and
allowed for the sharing of such property on divorce. 25() This was illustrated in the case
of Lyson Ngulube vs Dyness Daka,257 where the court found that the property in
dispute had been built jointly by both parties and ordered that the house be sold and the
proceeds thereof be shared equally between the parties.258 It has been noted that on
appeal, the subordinate courts regularly overturn local court decisions in favour of
I 259 I f I' .women on the ground that they are contrary to customary aw. An examp e 0 t lIS IS
the case of Gilhert Wal11unyil11a vs DOI"cas Kalebuka,260 where the Local Court held
that the nlatrinl0nial honle be shared between the parties in that the wi fe occupy three
rooms and the husband occupy the renlaining two rooms. This situation would prevai I
until husband could afford to get the wife a house of her own. The husband appealed to
the subordinate court, which overtullled the local courts decision and held that the
house belonged solely to hinl. In his judgment the Magistrate said that:
"After listening to the evidence for and against, I am left in no doubt in my mind that
it (the house) was bui It by the appellant, not by his wi fe. I do not rule out the
possibility of any contribution by the respondent and that contribution was made by
her as a married woman like any other woman would do in the circLllllstances".2(JI
156 Supra note 225 above @ Pg. 158
257 LCI 1306/ 1982 - Transcript on file with author - See Note 225 above -discussed therein
158 It should be noted that the court gave an alternative to the husband .He could pay the sum of K300 to
the wife as compensation. He obviously took the alternative.
J -9
-, Supra note 244 above @ 64
160 LCA 96/1981-Transcript on file with the author- See note 240 above
2(11 The Magistrates view of the facts is surprising especially since the husband did not refute much of the
evidence led by the wife. For example, the husband admitted the wife's contribution to the house when
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Women who are malTied under the Act are in a nluch better position as they retain their
capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of any property in their own right
2
<J2 and are
entitled to a share in the matrimonial property, including both joint property and their
husband's property on divorce. 263 The wife is also entitled to maintenance on
divorce2(14 and the High court has extensive discretionary powers to order one party to
nlaintain the other on divorce.265 However, the idea of nlaintenance of a divorced
wOlnan is alien to the African traditional way of life and legal thinking, and a husband
who is ordered to pay maintenance to his wife may therefore feel that he has a right to
exercise control over her the way he would his wife. 2()6
Custody of children is another contentious issue on divorce, as traditionally custody of
a child depended on the descent group that exists in Zanlbia. In matrilineal societies
that predonlinate, a child belongs to the mother's kinship group, and in patrilineal
societies the child belongs to the father's kinship group.267 The courts in lnaintenance
and custody battles seenl to follow a rule of thumb and it was discovered in a study
conducted 268that in most cases the courts awarded custody of school going children to
the father, and children below school going age were awarded to the mother, or if they
he said that his father- in-law had helped him towards the building expenses and admitted that he (the
father- in-law) had put more money into the building than his wife.
J6 J S- - upra note 225 above @? 158
~63 Supra note 225 above @ 159
JlJ.t- Supra note 225 above @ 151
~65 Ibid
266 Supra note 244 above
J67- Supra note 242 above @ 72
268 Study conducted on 42 Appeals in Lusaka of which 9 were abandoned and of the 33 left 25 school
going children were given to the father children below school going age given to the mother and 5
remaining cases custody given to both parents- Supra note 242 above at Pg. 72
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gave custody to the mother, they would allow for maintenance from the father, but this
rarely occurs and the courts would rather award custody to the father.
Mothers are not gIven the same rights as fathers, and some government provisions
discriminate against W0111en. This was challenged in the case of N(/H!akwi vs Allorlley
General of Zal1lbia269 where an unmarried l110ther had to swear fresh affidavits each
time she applied for a bilih certificate or passport for her minor children. She had to
state in those affidavits that she was the n10ther of the child and they were born out of
wedlock. Fathers on the other hand only had to give a letter of consent, to procure the
very same documents for their children. The court found that this practice
discriminated against mothers on the grounds of sex. High Court Judge Musumali J
said in his judgement that: " Discrimination based on gender had to be eliminated from
society. Mothers, whether Inarried or not were entitled to the same rights as fathers
over their children.,,27o He went on further to state that a single parent fan1ily, whether
headed by a n1ale or felnale was a recognized fan1ily unit within Zambian society and
that a mother of a child did not require a father's consent to have her child included in
her passport27I
The most notable conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion of marriaue
C>
and divorce in· Zambia is that the customary practices clearly discriminate against
wOlnen, in spite of the equality provisions contained in the constitution.
769
- C011l111Ol1lvealth Law Reports 1993 (3) ({y 231
170
- Supra note 269 above (f.i) 232
271 Ibid
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The judiciary has not been a consistent advocate of women's rights, as the high court
with judgll1ents like Nawakwi 272 would promote wonlen's rights and the subordinate
courts would limit them. It is submitted that all the blame cannot be laid at the door of




There are two types of marriages in Zimbabwe, the civil marriage under the Marriage
Act,273 which is monogamous and the customary marriage under the African MalTiages
. J74Act which is polyganl0us and which only Afncans can contract.- Customary
maniages that are not registered under section 3 of the African Maniages Act are
void,275 but are regarded as valid for the purposes of African law and custom relating
to the status, guardianship, custody and rights of succession of the children of such
. 276SI' d' c 1I .manlages. uc 1 customary nlalTlages are very conlmon an most marriages fa ll1to
this category.
'7'- - Supra note 263 above @ Pg. 232
'173 Marriage Act-Chapter 37
274 A.!i·icall Marriages Act Chapter 238 @ Sec 13
275 1. Stewart; W. Ncube; M Maboreke; A.Armstrong 'The Legal situation of women in Zimbabwe' in
The Legal Situation of Women in Southern A.!i·ica (eds) Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong (cD 173
276 Ibid
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Under the African Marriages Act before a marrIage can be registered the marrIage
officer must be satisfied about the lobolo agreement277 and the consent of the guardian
of the woman is required. 27x This usually results in her parents choosing a spouse
, 'd 279 d I' d Idependll1g on the amount of lobolo pal. Un er customary aw wives 0 not lave
property rights and all the property belongs to the husband. 2Ro Husbands also have
exclusive rights to divorce their wives and WOlnen are not allowed to claim damages
for adultery fron1 their husbands' won1en friends but the husband can sue other men for
fi d 1 I · . 1 I' , 281damages or a u terous re atlOns Wit 1 t lelr wives.
However the Legal Age of Majority Act No. 15 of 1982 and the Matrimonial Causes
Act No, 33 of 1985 recognize women's right to own property independently of their
fathers and husbands. 2R2 In Katkwe v Muchabaiwa 283 the leallled judge, Dumbutshena
Cl, concluded that in accordance with the Majority Act, women upon attaining
lnajority, becanle fully enlancipated and thus no longer required a legal guardian to
assist thenl in enforcing their legal rights, as they had IOCllS standi. This decision was
widely quoted in numerous other cases. However in Mwazozo v Mwazozo 2R4
277 Moses Chinyenze 'A Critique ofChigwenderes Book "Lobolo the Pros and Cons" in Relation to The
Emancipation of women in Zimbabwe' Zimbabwean Law Review 1983/84 ([j~ 229
'7ll- Supra note 275 above (if) 173
27l)We1shman Ncube 'Underprivi1ege and Inequality: The Matrimonial Property Rights of Women in
Zimbabwe' in Women and Imv ill Southern Aji'ica(l987) @11
28°Ibid
281 Ibid
282 Section 7 of of the Matrimonial Causes Act
2~.l 1984 (2) Zimbab\I'ean Law Reports @ 112
2~q SI 12 1194
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Muchecheter .lA concluded that the disabilities and discrimination suffered by women
under customary law were not predicated upon their perpetual minority status, but
rather were embedded in the patrilineal nature of African society. He went on further to
state that to allow women to sue in their own right would not only 'disrupt the African
custonlary laws of that society, but would be tantamount to bestowing additional rights
upon wonlen. ,285
It would seem that the judiciary has taken a step forward and two steps backward. The
recent case of Magayc/86 has indicated that discrimination still exists and it is
respectfully submitted that the judiciary needs to stop sacri ficing women's rights for
the preservation of custon1ary law, as when discrin1ination persists it is the custom that
should be ousted.
Divorce
Prior to 1985 the divorce law of Zinlbabwe was based squarely on the guilt principle2R7
that worked against the interests of the woman. The Matrimonial Causes Act2XX
abolished the guilt principle in divorce proceedings and introduced two new grounds
for divorce, the irretrievable breakdown of the n1an-iage and insanity or mental
illness.2~9 The test for the fornler ground is to ascertain whether the marrIage
285 He concluded further that the decision in Katekwe was wrongly decided. In this case the women tried
to inherit (look further at Magaya v Magaya) discussed under Inheritance.
286 Discussed fully under inheritance below-ZS 16-2-1999
~87- Supra note 275 above @ 173
288 No 33 of 1985
~ ~{l)
-, Supra note 275 above ({u 174
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relationship has broken down to such an extent that there is no reasonable prospect of a
. I' I' b I . 790nOl1llalmarnage re atlons IIp etween t le partles.-
Section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act nlakes provision for the court when granting
a decree of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of nlalTiage to make an order for the
division, apportionnlent or distribution of the assets of the spouses.
291
This includes the
order that any asset be transfelTed frOlTI one spouse to another and for the payment of
maintenance either in a lunlp sunl or in periodic payments.292 These sections of the Act
are made applicable to customary law marriages by the Anlendment of section 16 of
the African Marriages Act with section 16 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. ':93
The nlatrimonial property rights of women depend on whether they are Africans or
not294and on the systelTI of law under which they are nlarried. 295 Two non-Africans or
one African and one non-African can only nlarry under the general law,296 and have a
choice to nlalTY either in C0111nlunity of property or out of comnllll1ity of property.297 If
they choose the f0l111er they should conclude an ante-nuptial contract to that effect. If
they marry without one then their nlarriage is automatically out of community of
property, where each spouse retains their own property.2()~ This used to cause hardship
2<JO Ibid
?l) I -- Supra note 275 above @ 176
?(P
- - Supra note 279 above @ 12
29] Ibid
1945upra note 275 above @ 174 (This is discriminatory on the grounds of race)
195 Ibid




to women who spent their lives bringing up the children, taking care of the home etc,
as they usually walked away enlpty handed.
Now with section 7 of the Matrinl0nial Causes Act the court has the discretion to make
an equitable reallocation of the property of the spouses at divorce having regard to
their income, assets, financial needs and obligations, the standard of living of the
faInily, their health, the duration of the maniage and their direct or indirect
contributions made to the maniage and welfare of the family including domestic
duties.
21
)l) The main criticism of the reallocation formula is that it includes wide
discretionary powers of the court and this leads to a lack of fixed legal rights resulting
in uncertainty that leads to unnecessary litigation since there are no fixed standards by
which spouses can reach agreement
In the High Court case of Muchada vs Muchada300 the wife had taken care of the
children and supported thenl from her income. She had also conducted extensions to
the nlatrinlonial honle with some financial assistance from her husband who was
studying abroad. On divorce, reallocation of property in terms of section 7 was
considered and the court held that she was entitled to a half share in the proceeds of the
sale of her house. The learned Justice Gibson said:
J<)<)
- Supra note 275 above @ 176
,00 T " ["1" 1 1. ranscnpt on I e Wit 1 aut 101' - unreported
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"In my n,lind this is a proper case in which the defendant should get a fifty percent
share of the sale price of the house because it is largely due to her contribution and
industry that transformed the property into the state that it was at the date of the sale"
It is subnlitted that this is the correct approach for a country attempting to establish
equality between men and wonlen. The only problenl with the reallocation of property
is that it is likely to work against the interests of women who would be deprived of
property, because of SOlne conduct deemed to amount to a matrimonial offence and
thus reintroduce the 'guilt' principle indirectly.
The situation in Zimbabwe as regards marrIage and divorce has improved and the
judiciary and govenlnlent are attempting to work hand in hand to promote and stabilize
, 'I W . I . I' k 3() I UPwomen s rIg ltS. e notIce t lat 1I1 some cases I e Mwazozo and Magayc( - the
judges have weakened the status of African wonlen in Zimbabwe. However nluch
work is being done by wonlen's organizations and non-govenlmental organizations to
improve women's rights.
301 Discllssed above ({i) 59
302 Discussed under Inheritance
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CONCLUSION
On comparison generally it can be concluded that all of the countries under discussion
have made some attempts to n10uld their laws of marriage and divorce within the
confines of the right to equality. The greatest advancelllent has been the granting of
n1ajority status, as this grants WOlnen IOCllS standi and legal capacity to take their
violations to court.
All the countries seem to limit won1en's rights when it comes to traditional law. It is
apparent that this has caused hardship to women, in all spheres of marriage and
divorce. In countries like Swaziland, traditions like the red ochre ceremony make a
won1an's consent to a man-iage non-essential. Even more frightening is that a woman
will never be able to leave her obligations in ten11S of this union even if she divorces.
Although traditional concepts such as bridewealth and polygyny are unfair to women,
they have not been abolished in all of the countries under discussion and dual
marriages are commonplace.
Attelnpts have been n1ade to harmonize the civil and customary marriages into one, in
Swaziland and South Africa. However this has not been without problems. In South
Africa a huge gap exists, as regards the applicability to marriages concluded before the
c0111ing into force of the Act. In Swaziland it has resulted in making civil marriages
concluded between Africans subject to custon1ary laws.
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The courts in countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe have attempted to remove
discriminatory laws and practices. However this has not been consistent as some
judicial officers have considered the right to culture as more important that the right to
equality. The constitutions of all the countries have equality provisions and these have
effectively been used to help against discriminatory laws and practices. In Swaziland,
where the constitution has been suspended, we have seen a strengthening of customary
laws and hence not nluch inroads have been made in the field of W0111en's human
rights. Zimbabwe has nlade significant attempts to promote women's rights and this
should be applauded.
The govenlments thelTIselves have enacted laws that are discriminatory to women, like
the now repealed citizenship laws in Botswana. It is submitted that governments need
more that a token conlnlitnlent to international conventions like CEDAW, and should
do everything to rid their countries of discrilninatory laws and practices.
65
CHAPTER 3
2. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INHERITANCE
Land is an important natural resource the world over. Access to and ownership of land
is of prilnary importance to basic survival. WOlnen's access and control of land and
property is closely interrelated with their status and personal law. Therefore our
exalnination of the above topic will extend over con1111on characteristics already
discussed under the section dealing with 111arital power and contractual capacity.
Access to property is one of the most sensitive indicators of power relations and the
inferior position of women is especially evident in this regard. Although as already
noted, women play a vital role in food production and usually have unrestricted control
over staple foodstuffs, they are denied control over the n1eans of producing food ie.
land and 1ivestock. JOJ
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 'everyone has
the right to own property alone as well as in the association of others.' It further
provides in article 17 (2) that 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property'.
Article 14 of the African Charter states: 'the right to own property shall be guaranteed.'
Article 14(2) of CEDAW obliges states to ensure that rural women have the right to
equal treatnlent in land nlatters and agrarian refonll and article 16(h) confers on
-'03 T. W I3ennett ·SOllrcehook ofAfrica/l CllStOl1l({f)' Law' (/99/) (fl),325
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women the same rights as men with respect to ownership, administration, enjoyment
and disposition of property.
However, in spite of the above prOVISIons, a combination of customary and
contemporary law severely restricts property rights of women in Southern Africa.
Under custOlllary law the status of a woman is usually that of a minor whereby she is
always under the control of a male, either her father or her husband. This means that in
ten11S of real property, C0l11111Unal or clan property, a won1an has no capacity to
exercise ownership rights over it as the property belongs to her husband and the male
heirs of the clan,304 who retain 1110st of it even upon dissolution of marriage and
inheritance.
Control of property is the key to social empowerment, and had women been gIven
clear rights to property their overall position would have been much improved, but
unfortunately this aspect of their status appears to be nlost neglected.
We will now examine the various countries' laws of property and inheritance and how
they affect the women who live there.
:'\04 Katarina Tomsevski 'Women and Human Rights' Women and Law Development Series(I 995j
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Botswana
Women legally enJoy the same property rights as men. However in practice
discrimination exists, and it is n10st acute in rural areas where women who are engaged
in primarily subsistence agriculture have weak property rights.
305
Prior to 1998 the Deeds Registry Act306 did not allow for imn10vable property to be
registered in the nan1e of a wife. Now the Act also stipulates that neither spouse can
dispose of joint property without the written consent of the other party. However, it
should be noted that women are frequently forced and coerced into giving this written
.:107consent.
Won1en maITied under customary law and those man-ied under community of property
are the 1110st disadvantaged where property rights are concen1ed. However, since 1996
W0111en n1alTied in con1illunity of property can own ilTIlTIovable property in their own
name. 30X Nevertheless, the husband still retains considerable control over the joint
estate of the malTiage and courts arc generally unwilling to interfere with the husbands'
powers of administration:10l) Under customary law the husband also has the right to
administer the separate property of the wife. In the case of Molol1lO vs Mo 10171 0 3 I ()
l05/ / r / .- Ittp. H'WW. u.s. Dept. ~ State Human Rights Reports/or /999/ Botswana.htm
306 Deeds Registl)! Act 1998
307 Supra note 305 above
308Ibid
309A. Molokomme 'Marriage in Botswana -What every woman wants or civil death'?' in WOlllen and
Law in Southern Aji-ica @186
310 1979-80 BLR ~{)250
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] udge Hannah decided that the comnlon law would apply to the disposal of the spouses
property and she said that:
"The spouses lived a sophisticated way of life and it would be unjust and inequitable to
I I I
,,31 1app y t le customary aw
Traditionally women were not entitled to inherit the bulk of a deceased person's
estate312 because there was the belief that daughters would marry into another family
. 11 3 .,( 970 114 I . .and take the property wIth her.' The Succession Act oJ / 'gave t le survlvlllg
spouse the right to inherit some of the property of the deceased and also provided for
the deceased's dependants to clainl maintenance from the estate should they have been
insufficiently provided for in the will. 31 ) This Act does not cover customary law
estates316 and leaves those widows in an unprotected state, dependant on the generosi ty
of their in-laws who are the usual beneficiaries in customary succession. 317
W0111el1 nlan-ied in C01111TIUnity of property are in a better position and are
autOlTIatically entitled to half of the joint estate on the death of the spouse. 31 x
311 She based her decision on Dissolution olMarriages Act of 1926 that makes a provision for the
judicial officer to apply the common law if it would be just and equitable to do so.
312A. Molokomme 'Womens Law in Botswana in The Legal Situation of W011len in Southem A/i'iuI
(eds) lulie Stewart and Alice Armstrong @! 21 .
313 Ibid
31~ The Succession Rights of the Surviving Spouse and Inheritance Family Provision Act of 1970
(Chapter 31 :03)
315 Provided there was a will-in most cases there is no will -See note 301 above
316 In other words it is not available to the dependents of most Batswana who generally die intestate and
whose property devolves in accordance with customary law.
, 17
- Supra note 312 aboYe @Pg. 23
.'I~ lbid
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Freedom of testation exists and it is suggested that in order to protect the wi fe,
husbands especially in customary unions should make a wi 11. In the case of Fraenkel
ond AnD vs Sechele,3llJ the testator had married according to the common law and had
executed a will and codicil bequeathing his estate to his wife. His capacity to do so was
contested on the ground that it was contrary to Tswana customary law of succession
and that he had not abandoned a 'tribal way of life.' The court rejected both arguments
and said that in tenns of the Wills Proclalnation Act No. 19 of 1957 a general power
was given to all people to execute wills even if this meant upsetting the customary law
of intestate succession.
South Africa
Many legal baniers to won1en acquiring and disposing of property have been renl0ved
with the ilnprovement of their legal capacity under the InatTiage laws, especially the
Custom([/~V Marriages Act 120 of 1998. Under Civil Law all women are automatically
married in community of property and the joint property is equally administered and
owned between the spouses, and verbal or written spousal consent is required for
dealing in all joint property. The property clause in the constitution stipulates that the
state must take reasonable and other measures within its avai lablc resources to foster
conditions, which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 320
319 1964 HCTLR 70
320 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
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Section 28( 1) of the Constitution provides further that every person shall have the right
to acquire and hold property.32I
Before 1998, legal barriers continued to exist for women living under Customary Law
as in nlany instances, wonlen had no independent access to property but were
dependant on their relationships with men (husbands, fathers, sons) to gain access to
I .. . . I d j22 U Iland. In custonlary aw succeSSion IS intestate, unlversa an onerous.- pon t le
death of the family head, his oldest son succeeds to the status of the deceased and an
heir inherits not only the deceased's property but also his responsibility to support
surviving family dependants. Widows acquire no more than a personal j-ight against the
heir to maintenance out of the estate. 323 Constitutional norms of equal treatment and
non-discrimination pose the major challenge to this order and the customary rule that
the deceased's heir be nlale constitutes discrimination against female descendants.
In 1985 and 1987 lilnited recognition was given to the problenls of women's status in
customary law by presuming full legal capacity for the purpose of acquiring, protecting
and disposing of leasehold and freehold land in certain urban areas. The position of the
surviving spouse in a situation of interstate succession was improved in 1987. However
two critical areas of COnCel1l remain.
321 Section 28 ( 1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
322 See note 323 below
323 T. W. Bennett- Human Rights and Ajdcan CllstOl1UU:v Law @ 126 - In the case of Menziwa vs Gqati
(1934 NAC83) It was held that the heir has the power to dispose of assets for the benefit of the family
and the widow cannot demand possession of the estate nor can she prevent the heir from alienating it if
she is being suitably maintained. Nevertheless widows may be consulted before heirs dispose of major
assets. Quoted from T. W. Bennett @) 142
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First, women have no rights to inherit directly from the estate of their husbands in
African customary law and secondly, African women who are married by civil rites
and out of community of property are subject to the customary law of succession by
the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.324 In the case of Zondi vs President 0/ the
Republic ofSouth Africa and Others325 it was held that Regulation 2 of the Regulations
for the Adnlinistration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks32 () offends
against the equality provisions of the constitution to the end that it distinguishes
between estates of Black persons not nlatTied in community of property and those
married under antenuptial contract or in community of property for the purposes of
intestate succession and was therefore invalid. It was directed that the estates of the
deceased devolve in accordance with the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.327
Further, WOlnen expenence nlany adnlinistrative and procedural impedinlents in
seeking to claim their inheritance rights. In a leading case of Mthel71hu vs Letsela and
Clnother
328
the Pretoria High Court considered the application of the Bill of Rights and
it was said, "Women have lost the war for equality between the sexes". 329 In this case,
involving succession to the whole of the deceased person's intestate estate, the
respondent (father of the deceased) opposed an application by the widow to succeed to
the estate. The applicant sought to have section 23 (2) of the Black Administration
-,2-t Most of the offending sections of this Act have been repealed.
325 19993 SA.L.R 49
-'26 R200 of 6 February 1987
317 An important decision of this case was that both legitimate and illegitimate children of a deceased
African person would qualify to inherit intestate.
32R 19972 SA.L.R 936 (T)
329Mandla Nkala 'Any Chance a/Emancipation/or the African Woman' October De Rebus Ql~ 39
72
Act330 regulating succession nullified on the basis that it was inconsistent with the Bill
of Rights, as the system of primogeniture discriminated on the grounds of sex or
gender.:<31 However, the court granted judgment in favor of the respondent on the basis
that everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of his choice in terms of
section 30. 332 Therefore the Customary Prinl0geniture Systenl was upheld. But section
30 further says that no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner that is
inconsistent with any provision of the Bi 11 of Rights.
This can be said to be in violation of the equality clause, which provides that the state,
through its judicial organs have to promote equality and may not unfairly discriminate
directly. or indirectly on the grounds of sex or culture.3D Is the upholding of the
prinl0geniture system not an indirect discrinlination against women on the grounds of
sex?334 The judgnlent turned on the question of unfairness. Le Roux J found that,
while the estate devolved upon a nlale heir, the custOlnary law required him to support
the surviving widow and dependants. Thus, a widow was entitled to remain at the
deceased's homestead where she could continue to benefit from the estate and the heir
could not eject her.
:>30 Act 38 of 1927
331 The Primogeniture system provide that only male relatives of the deceased may succeed as heirs to
the estate.
332 Section 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
33:> Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
33~ Supra note 329 above
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The court therefore decided that customary law does not prejudice women because it
gives them rights to maintenance.3:l 5 However one must bear in mind that the right to
maintenance is a personal right and surely if we know that women do su ffer neglect
and deprivation then they should be gi ven the protection of real rights. :U(l It is
subn1itted that the judiciary 111issed an opportunity to grant W0111en in customary unions
the powers to acquire real rights to property in succession.
The Recognition of The Customary Marriages Act337 provides equal status and capacity
to spouses in Customary MalTiages and regulates the proprietary consequences of such
marriages. Section 6 of The Act provides that:
"A wi fe in a Customary MalTiage has, on the basis of equality with her husband ...
full status and capacity including the capacity to acquire assets and dispose of them".
In additio11 to dealing with the specifics of lnan-iage the Act also touches on the
broader socio-ecol10111ic aspects in women's lives. The Act decrees that women in
customary marriages have the right to acquire assets and dispose of them, to enter into
contracts and to litigate.
.1.15 This ruling inadvertently raised a complex socio- legal issue, which makes the judgement highly
debatable. Traditionally personal rights to maintenance would have been underwritten by the extended
family system and a highly developed ethic of helping kin. Mthembu's case implicitly regards the fact
that customary law withholds real rights from women as fair and acceptable. In the western world,
however, real rights guarantee a person's material security. If we bear in mind that traditional African
social structures are fast disintegrating, then there is a likelihood that in a modern African context the
protections formerly afforded by customary law may no longer work to the benefit of women. ( This
argument appeared in T. W. Bennett @ note 342 below
.136 Addendum to Humall rights alld A.[i'icall CUSIOI1WI)J Law- T. W Bennett.
337 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
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Whereas women under customary law were previously deemed to be perpetual minors,
the Act states that despite customary law rules, the age of majority of any person is
determined in accordance with the South African Age of Majority Act. 33x Lt is a pity
that the Mthenlbu case was decided before the Act was passed; perhaps the plaintiff
d d · 1 I' . l' 339would have succee e 111 ler c a1l11 to 1I11entance.
Since the 1994 interinl Constitution customary law has been attacked on many fronts.
In the case of Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund340 the learned justice
Mahomed C.J found that a widow of a Muslim religious marriage is indeed a
dependant for the purposes of a dependant's action. The legislature also extended the
action to widows of African customary unions in section 31 of the Black Laws
Amendment Act. There is therefore no reason why a widow in a customary union
cannot inherit especially in light of the Recognition of Custonlary Marriages Act and
the Age of Majority Act. 34 I
In the case of succession a court could not simply rule custOlnary norms void. It would
have to stipulate how much widows could inherit and under what circumstances.
Details of this nature cannot be determined in judicial proceedings and the proper
reform would be legislation, which permits full investigation of the social context and
consultation with interested groups.3'+2
338 Act 57 of 1972.
339 Any Chance of Emancipation for the African woman'? Mandla Nkala De Re/ms Oct 1999
340 19994 SALR @1319 (S.C.A.)
341 Act 57 of 1972
341 T. W. Bennett .HUll1all Rights alld A/i'icoll LustOI11WY L{/'rll' ~u. 95
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In l'v1ay 1998 the Special Project Conlmittee on the Hanl10nization of Common and
. d . . I 143 H b rCustomary law publlshe a paper on successIOn In customary aw.- - owever elore
the normal consul tation process could run its course, the Department of Justice
submitted a Bill to the National Assembly proposing in essence the abolition of the
I f . 344custonlary aw 0 successIOn. Elements of age and gender discrimination were
removed by a sinlple provision that whenever a deceased person died intestate the
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 would apply to his or her estate. When traditional
leaders becanle aware of the Bill they protested and the Bill was withdrawn. 345 This
indicates that South Africa needs to change a lot of perceptions before the law of
succession is overhauled.
Swaziland
Succession like other areas of law is govenled by both general and customary law.
Under the general law there is a distinction between testate and intestate succession. 34()
Where no will is left, the Intestate Successioll Act347 applies to those who have
concluded a civil marriage. Thus a widow who was nlalTied in community of property
~43 See Human Rights and African Customary Law T. W. Bennett @ 204-205
.,44 Ibid
345 Ibid
.146 R. T Nh1apo 'The Legal Situation of Women In Swazi1and and Some Thoughts on Research' in The
Legal Situation ot" Women in Swaziland - (eds) Julie Stewart and Alice Armstrong 97 (fl) 123
347 No 3 of 1953 .
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is included among the children of the deceased and qualifies for an equal share with
I . I ,. 148t lem 111 t le J01l1t estate.'
Where the marriage is out of con1munity of property the widow is entitled to succeed
to the extent 0 f a chi Id's share, or so n1uch as does not exceed the amount sti pu lated
fron1 time to time. 349 In the absence of children, regardless of the marital regime, she is
entitled to a half share. If a parent, brother, or sister of the deceased survives they get
the other half. 35o lfnone of the above are alive she becomes the sole heir. 351
The customary law position however is not as silnple. First there is no general
recognition of testate succession352 although some men do indicate their preferred heir
before they die. 353 Confirmation of this choice however depends entirely on the family
'I I I ' . I 354counCI, w 10 nlay Ignore lIS WIS les. Swazi customary succession IS
unconlprOlnisingly patrilineal355and is ainled at finding only a male heir. Even if the
deceased has no son, his widow or daughter still cannot inherit. 35 ()
The estate of an unmanied woman devolves upon her father even if she has sons. 357
:~: Provided that the 'vall,le of the share does not exceed E 1200 (this value was at 1993)
. The same amount as Il1 note 348 above
:>50 Supra note 346 above
:>51 Ibid
:>51 Supra note 346 above @ 124
:>5:> Ibid
354 Ibid
:>55 Supra not 346 above @ 124
:>56 Supra note 346 above @ 125
:>57 Ibid
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In cases where a civil marrIage was concluded and the parties did not opt out of
section 24 of the MalTiage Act, or of a dual marriage, or where the parties agree, the
master deals with the estate on the basis of the common law and the statute.
3SX
This
practice of the master should be applauded as it protects females from the obvious
inj ustices of custonlary succession.
Private tenure land is governed by conl1non law rules of ownership and is subject to
relatively unrestricted purchase and sale. An ul1lnarried major woman may buy, sell,
and have it registered in her name unassisted. 359 So may a woman married out of
community of property with the exclusion of her husbands marital power. 3()o Even a
woman malTied under customary law may register private tenure land in her own
name. Only a wonlan married in community of property under her husband's marital
power cannot register inlmovable property in her own name. 361
Although women can own land in the abovementioned cases, the general practice of
town counci Is has indicated otherwise and it has been reported that when women go
there to purchase property, they are told to go and bring their husbands.:H>2
Swazi state land is inalienable and malTied women have the right to cultivate this land




361 Deeds Registry Act No. 37 of 1968
3CJ2 Thandabantu Nhlapo 'Ownership of freehold land in Swaziland' in WOII/(!Il ([Ild L((\II ill SOlithall
~fi-ic(l (eds) Alice Armstrong and Welshman Ncube @49
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Property rights of women in Swaziland are far from satisfactory. Although the Legal
Age of Majority Act gives all women over 21 majority status, traditional arrangcments
that see a woman as a minor continue unabated. Unlike most of the other Southern
African countries discussed herein, traditional institutions in Swaziland are rarely
challenged and are getting stronger.
Even without presunling to venture into the anthropological and sociological factors
underlying African thinking on the position of wonlen in society, it is possible to
conclude that in the case of Swaziland, maintenance of thc 'propcr' rclationship
between the sexes is a crucial ingredient in the well-being of the nation.~(J3 Any
modernizing influences are resisted at all costs because of the generalized fear that 'a
nation which abandons its traditional way of life is doomed,,364
Zambia
Access to land for a wonlan under customary law is dependent on the traditional rights
women have in a particular African society.3()) The most common system is where the
women do not own land but have usufruct rights to the land.3()() In thc Lo::i tribe a
woman is entitled to land rights but when she gets married that land right is transferred
363 Supra note 362 above @51
364 Ibid
365 Frances Mwangala Zaloumis Paper presented at a Namibian Workshop titled 'Approaches to Gender
Equality under Customary Law' -Obtained from the Legal Resources Cell/re in Cape Town
36C! lbid
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to another person in the same fanli1y.3(J7 The right to land will be restored to her upon
her return to the vi Ilage or upon dissolution of nlarriage.3(JR
The husband usually gives his wife a piece of land but any rights thereto only exist
during the subsistence of the nlarriage.369 When he dies his children and family may
inherit but his wife is not entitled to any portion of that inheritance including the
land.370 Reflections of the traditional societies in Zanlbia indicate that after a husband
or father's death the property would be entrusted to one of the male relatives of the
deceased who is 'obliged' to take care of the dependants of the deceased.37I
This obligation has eroded with a breakdown in traditional values and 'property
grabbing,372 is the order of the day, and the deceased's fanlily takes all his property
and the widow is left destitute. 373 One such case is that of Adil1ar Mklll7lha vs Phiri. 374
The deceased husband was survived by his wife, Adinar and seven l11inor children. The
defendant was the deceased's brother who was appointed adnlinistrator of the estate.
Adinar sued the administrator for not supporting her and the children financially. The
deceased was a businessman and was operating a fleet of mini buses. After his death
:'07 Ibid
3M~ Ibid
36') Supra note 365 above @ 8
370 Ibid
J71 Supra note 365 above (£~ 9
371 Because a woman in African customary law is never regarded as part of her husbands clan his
relatives upon his death remove from her possession any property that they wish even though she may
have acquired it out of her own means, this is known as property grabbing.
37:> The deteriorating economic situation at national level has spread down to household level and made
people very greedy, household goods and houses are very expensive hence the grabbing of property
from the widow is an easy way of acquiring property.
37-1 Le 13 II 1981 Zambia
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the young brother was appointed to 'cleanse' or 'purifyd75 her, and subsequently took
all the property including buses, from where income had been generated to feed the
family. She then claimed for a share orthe income from the operation of the buses. The
court upheld the plaintiffs clainl and ordered the defendant to pay her SOlne money
from the deceased estate for the maintenance of the chi ldren. 376
There are nlany similar cases that go unreported because the relatives of the deceased
and fears of 'bewitchment' intinlidate the widow or they do not have funds to pay for
legal representation.
However, the widow should take her plight to the courts who are usually sympathetic,
as illustrated by the following case Estate of Pinyolo vs Administrator General. 377 In
this case the deceased applied to the High court for revocation of the letters of
adnlinistration granted to the Admin-General and for the grant of letters of
adnlinistration to hinlself. It was subnlitted on behalf of the applicant that he was the
rightful person to administer the estate because the deceased's kin had appointed him,
as is the BemhaJ78 tradition. The High Court held that the deceaseds wife and children
were the next of kin and not the applicant and the High Court commissioner said that:
375 When the husband dies and inm1ediately after burial the widow is given a man to have sexual
intercourse with her usually a relative of the deceased as it is believed that she will go around carrying
her late husbands ghost .If it is not performed there is a belief that her new husband might die.
376Chuma Himonga 'Property Disputes in Law and Practice-Dissolution of Marriage in Zambia' in
WOl1len {lnd La\\' in SOlithem Aji'ica 56 @ 69-70 .
377 I983/HP/1 02- unreported - This High Court decision was discussed in Muna Ndulo 'Widows under
Zambian Customary Law and the Response of the Courts' ClLSA 1995 Vo!. 18
.l7X A predominant tribe in Zambia
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"In this era it is compelling that the deceased's children get the lions share of the
estate to uuarantee their education and to let them continue in their station in society.
b
Times are changing and me with them, custom cannot claim to be superior if in doing
so it retains inequity ... man works not for his relatives but for himself, his wife and
his chi Idren. ,,379
Widows do inherit under the statutory laws relating to pension funds, insurance and
employment benefits of the deceased but son1etimes the relatives demand a share of the
money..~X() There are two laws that can assist women namely; The lnteslale Succession
Acl No. 5 of 1989,381 which indicates how property should be distributed without a will
and The Wills and Administration of Estales Acl 1989382 which deals with cases where
a wi Il has been n1ade.
A possible reason why lnany won1an have not taken advantage of these laws is because
n1any won1en do not know about then1 and further it is regarded as shameful for a
woman to be seen to be interested in the family property.
Although women's access to land vanes throughout the country, the laws of
inheritance, ownership and control of land typically discriminate women, because the
379 It should be noted that this case only deals with the control over the administration of the estate - but
from research has been discovered that the Attorney General usually gives the deceaseds widow a share
of the estate regardless of the customary law.
3~O Supra note 376 above @Pg. 73
381 This Act integrates the customary intestate succession laws, and alters the rights of widows and
children in respect of intestate estates - The surviving spouse and children are given the right to inherit
directly from the deceased's spouses parents or deceased estate
382 This Act provides a unified law for the making of wills.
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man is seen to be the head of the household he is usually favoured in the allocation of
. I I I d 3X,agncu tura an . -
In a study conducted 111 1990 it was discovered that although female-headed
households represent about one third of all rural Zambian households, few single
women fa1111erS received assistance from any progran1nles funded by donor agencies,
384
except were funds were clearly earn1arked for women.
It has further been noted that the courts in property disputes385 have always favoured
granting the woman conlpensation rather than appropriate land. The only plausible
explanation for the court's decision is the general view held by judicial officers that
property orders in favour of the women are contrary to customary law.
The courts have not, faced adequately the problem of the unsuitability of the customary
rule of inheritance, to nl0de111 conditions and to the bulk of n1arriages under the
MalTiage Act. The courts when faced with this problenl have not enquired into the
nature of the property at issue; the differences between traditional society and modern
society; and the question of the maintenance of the widow and chi ldren after the death
of the husband and father. 3g6 In failing to do this, the courts ignore their responsibit'ity
for developing the law according to the needs of society.
383 See note 386 below
384Felicia Sekula- Violence against women in Southern Africa
31\5 Whether dealing with a death or divorce
JX(\ MlIna Ndlllo . WidoH's Ullder ZWllhiall CUS(()I/UIIY La)\' alld the Respollse (~{the Courts' CILSA 1995
Vo!. 18
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It must also be noted that application of the traditional concepts of the customary law
of succession to women in a modern context is unjust, discriminatory and outlawed by
1 b' .' 3X7t le Zam lan constItution.
Zimbabwe
African women may own ilTImovable property and in practice rights of African spouses
to immovable property were determined as if they were married out of community of
property. It therefore appears that African WOll1en have always been capable of owning
immovable property (outside of communal or native reserve property) although very
few women had the resources to do so.
Under custonlary law on divorce the husband is entitled to retain all property.388 This
inequitable position of the law was one of the reasons the legislature enacted section 7
of the Matrimonial Causes Act389, which allows the court to reallocate property
equitably on dissolution of marriage by divorce. The problem is that it does not apply
to malTiages in community of property and has no bearing on succession.3()()
387 Supra note 377 above
388 except the mom/)e yohUl11a i/inko 111 0 yoh!anga property which the woman acquires on the marriage of
her daughter. Maoko/il11paph!a zezolld/a property which a woman acquires through her own skill.
3Xl) See section on marriage and divorce in Zimbabwe for a full discussion of Act~
-,,)Il lbid
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The law of succession is governed by general law or customary law and has in the past
depended on the race of the deceased. If the deceased was an African the customary
law would apply and if the deceased was not an African the general law would apply,
Under customary law females are not allowed to inherit and the widow is taken care of
by the male heir. If the heir did not honour his obligations of support he could be
cOlnpelled to do so. This view of the duty of the heir was adopted in Masollgo v
Masollgo, 3
1
)1 where Justice Beck held that the heir at customary law, in the absence of
suitable and available alternatives was obliged to provide accommodation for the
widow or widows of the deceased and their children.
However, the situation in Zinlbabwe has been precarious as can be seen in the case of
Magaya vs Magaya 392concerning the application of African customary law to
succession. The deceased in this case, had l11alTied two wives in terms of the African
customary law. One felnale child was born Venia Magaya, the appellant who claimed
heirship to the deceased estate. 393 The community court lnagistrate held that the
applicant could not be appointed as heir as she was a woman. 394 In terms of the
I, bl 1
1
)"app lca e customary laws' . the eldest male heir succeeds the deceased and in this
case there was a male heir.
This decision was taken on appea1. 3% The appeal was dismissed and the court
concluded thar the "disabilities and discrimination suffered by wonlen were not
'91.' Unreported SC/66/86
1<)1 .
. - Case SC 210/98- Reported 111 CUl1ll1lOlI\vea!th Lm\' Reports 2000
'I)'
.> .' Supra note 392 above @i, 1 f-g
,94. Supra note 392 above ([0, I g-h
.195 Namely section 68 (1) of the Admil1ist/'(/tiul/ olEstates Act
Y)h Supra note 392 above .
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predicated upon their minority status but rather were elnbedded in the patrilineal nature
of African society." The learned judges397 stated further that to allow women to inherit
in a broadly patrilineal society would disrupt the African customary laws and would be
tantanlount to bestowing'additional rights' upon wonlen.
398
It is respectfully subnlitted that the Iea111ed judges gave precedence to African
customary law over its international and constitutional obligations
3l
)9 to protect women
and failed to advance gender equality. Instead it just reaffi1111ed male privilege. Further
the decision in Kafekwe vs MUc!lllbaiwa400 was criticized and the five judges held
unanimously that it was wrongly decided. In Katekwe the Supreme Court held that
under the Legal Age of Majority Act,401 a daughter no longer needed a guardian to sue
for her and she could do so in her own right.
W7 MuchechetereJA; Gubbay CJ; Ebrahim and Sandura JJA concurring
_,lIX Supra note 392 above ({iJ 13 f-g
3\)\) In this case Zimbabwes obligation to respect International conventions to which it is a party and
under which it was oblidged to advance gender equality, was discussed and the learned Iv!uchechela(! J
said that' while I am in total agreement with the submission that there is a need to advance gender
equality in all spheres of society. I am of the view that great care must be taken when African
customary law is under consideration. In the first instance it must be recognised that customary law has
long directed the way African people conducted their lives and the majority of Africans in Zimbabwe
still live in rural areas and still conduct their lives in terms of customary law In the circumstances it will
not be readily abandoned, especially by those such as senior males who stand to lose their position of
privilege. 'He justified it by saying that the application of customary law is sanctioned by the
constitution.
400 se 87/ 84 - The supreme courts interpretation of the Legal Age of Majority Act was discussed and
has been followed in a number of significant decisions like, ChihOl\'{l vs lv!ongH'elule- 1987 ( 1) ZLR 228
and Iv!vaecheno \'S Iv!vaecheno se 52/88 amongst others. Both these cases advanced women's rights
under customary law.
40 I 0 - dd- dd-lscusse un er marnage an Ivorce
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The court went further and pointed out that an African woman who was a major could
now contract a maITiage without the consent of her customary guardian and without
payment of bridewealth. At the time, Katekwe was hai led as a victory for women's
rights.
It is disappointing to note that in 1993 the goven1n1ent of Zimbabwe issued a white
paper on marriage and inheritance, and it concluded that the customary laws of
property were not well suited to modenl urban life. It made particular mention of the
wife's limited right to own or inherit property and its unacceptability. It proposed that
the customary laws of succession should be revised to provide for the equal division of
the deceased's estate between the surviving spouse and the children;~o2 and in contrast
the judiciary in the Magaya case refused to take the opportunity to in1plenlent reform.
More surprisingly, in the decision otChihowa vs Mangwellde 403 the deceased had died
intestate leaving his widow and two major daughters. One daughter applied to succeed
to her father's estate relying on the Legal Age of Mcu·orit)' Act.-w4 The learned judge
said, "It is n1Y opinion that there is nothing now in any enactment or at customary law
which prohibits a woman from being appointed an intestate heiress". This is a good
eXaInple of the positive developlnent of African customary law.
·H)] Journal orA/i·icon Loll' 1994 (j1167
·111., 1987 1 Zil1l!Ja!JII'eall Lml" Report C£l) 228
.j().j Act 15 of 1982
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Howevcr, it is noted, that the Chihowa and Kalekwe cases were decided before the
Magaya case. Is it then a question of the courts taking one step forward and two stcps
backward? It is even nlore disappointing to note that the judges in the Magaya case,
said that Katekwe was wrongly decided knowing full well that the Katekvve decision
was heralded as a victory for wonlens rights.
It is submitted that the judiciary and governnlent need to lnake thc advancement of
gender equality a priority, especially in light of an article on human rights watch405
which stated, 'In August 1998 the government denied a petition by womcn's groups
that one third of the land redistributed under the land reform programme be headed by
wonlen' (which reportedly make up one third of all rural households). Joseph Msika,
Minister without Portfolio and in charge of the land resettlement said: "I would have
my head cut off if I gave a W0111an land,,.406
·W5 http/\""ww/ human rts watch .co.za
4tl() lbid
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CONCLUSION TO PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INHERITANCE
Wonlen in Southern Africa have suffered discrimination because of the laws relating to
property and inheritance. All traditional syste111s prohibit a woman's accession to
property on the death of her father or husband. These laws are a major obstacle to
women's rights to equality and go against all that international women's document are
hoping to achieve.
Property grabbing is equivalent to violence against women and depletes whatever little
resources she has. This practice is prevalent in countries like Zambia and the courts
have not addressed this issue adequately. In most cases the courts will grant a woman
rights to 111aintenance and usufructuary rights, but not ownership. It is submitted that
traditional nlindsets need to change, and goVe111nlents should enact laws that protect
widows.
In general the rules of inheritance are undeveloped. Women in Southern Africa bear
the brunt of running the household and it seems ludicrous that they are expected to do
so without any real rights to property. The nlajor purpose of succession is to provide
for one's dependants after one's death. The preslllllption that only males can fulfill this
obligation is un"reasonable as throughout Africa, WOlnen are the primary subsistence
fa111lerS and the nlain care givers and bear the sole obligation for child rearing.
89
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion it can be concluded that international human rights norms
are not incOll1patible with African law and can effectively be utilized by the courts for
the advancenlent of WOll1en'S rights. All of the countries discussed contain statutory
laws that grant women their rights to equality but the courts in their application of
these laws have nlade these rights subject to customary practices that linlit women's
rights. Some judicial officers in Southe111 Africa seenl to think that by preserving
customary law precepts they are protecting' African heritage.' However this is not the
case. Customary law should not be perceived as indistinguishable from 'African
heritage' but should be subject like any other law to the changing times and opinions of
the people.
The courts should not forget that respect for the law could only be achieved if the law
furthers the needs and confonTIs to the circumstances of the society immediately
:
subject to it. Their failure to use the law to achieve just social solutions to problems
and to reform society effectively thwarts developnlent and advancement in customary
law, and consequently also reduces respect for it. 407 We must also remember that the
custonlary law of today is the product of colonialisnl and capitalism, which has
resulted in a sOll1ewhat, skewed version of the original custonlary practices. It is
suggested that 'living law' which reflects the real life experie~lces of people on a day to
-107 MlIna Ndlllo .Widows IInder ZUlllhiulI CllsIO/1/(II:1" Lull' {{lid Ihe Respollse (d'lhe lourls . Cl LSA 1995
Voll8
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day basis should be encouraged as a potential force for the improvement of women's
rights.
From the discussions above it has enlerged that although courts have exposed and
opposed wonlen's human rights violations in Southern Africa, a lot of work still has to
be done especially in legal literacy408, to ensure that women take their issues to the
courts and demand a hearing. Governments also have an obligation to guarantee that
women are given these rights and the judiciary is entitled to enforce these rights and
should not sacri fice wonlen' s rights in the name of culture.
We nlust remenlber that wonlen in Africa especially those in rural areas suffer by
cOll1parison with men and wonlen in n10st other parts of the world as a result of
cultural balTiers interacting with low levels of economic development. Poverty marks
more than three-qua11ers of the residents in sub -Saharan Africa. Further no discussion
of sustainable economic development is complete without the input of women, who in
many places are the backbone of economic development, and in every place are thc
persons who must cope on a daily basis with the consequences of inequitable
409development .
40R Legal literacy has been defined as an instrument of empowerment going far beyond the use of laws
and procedures as the are. The idea is not to familiarize women with the complexities of the legal system
so that they would be trapped within them, but to enable women to take their issues to the court without
fear of prejudice or ridicule and to encourage them to be critical of laws that discriminate against them.
.l()l) _ Marsha A.Freeman 'Women, Law and the Land at the Local level: Claiming Women's""'Human
Rights in Domestic Legal Systems' HUII/Wf Rights Quartety Va!. 16 1994 '-
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Given Southern Africa's precarious economic position it cannot afford to have more
than half of its population without basic human rights that are imperative to their
personal upliftment and without which they cannot make a greater contribution to the
econonlY of Africa. The full and conlplete development of a country or a continent
requires the freeing of its human potential and the fullest pal1icipation of all its citizens
. . 410 I I b f d d . f111 all fields, men and women altke. T lose w 10 ecause 0 out ate notIons 0
equality cannot support the emancipation of women should at least lend their support
in order to achieve economic development in Africa. The economics of African
countries will never develop fully unless they promote the rights ofwomen.411
Trelnendous potential exists for developing and applying inte111ational human rights
nonns In the endeavor to Improve wonlen's rights throughout the world. Non
discrinlination clauses in laws and constitutions can be invoked to establish women's
capacity to function in every respect as adults in their society. It is important for
governments to establish women's rights by legislation, even in circumstances in
which women may not be able to take immediate advantage of them, because unless
they are in place, women have little hope of gaining new ground. 412
Movenlents to defend hunlan rights always enlerge in response to violations. This has
occulTed with Women's rights as in any other hunlan rights issue and silence enables
the continuation of violations. The worst response to violations is to do nothing.
~I() Winston Langley . The Rights of WO/J/C/l, The Afi'ican Charter, And The Eco/lo/J/ic Develop/J/e/lt of
Af;'ic'(f' Boston Third World Law Journal 1987 Vol7 (£l) 215
~II Ibid
~11- Supra note 410 above
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Violations have to be recognized as human rights Issues In order to be reported,
prosecuted, conden1ned and ren1edied
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following rec0111mendations are suggested:
I. Existing laws should be used for legal activism. Legal reform should be sought
through reinterpretation of accepted laws by applying them to women's situations,
such as using inte111ational human rights conventions for addressing violence
against won1en.
2. The constitutionality of biased laws and justice system practices should be
questioned. Linkages between violations of hunlan rights and laws that are
oppressive to wonlen in nlany areas including personal and family law should be
identi tied and remedied.
3. We should affirnl and argue the universality of women's human rights regardless
of religion or culture.
4. We should use inte111ational law and standards to push for reform, either through
cases brought in the inte111ational arena or by using inte111ational principles to set
standards for don1estic law.
5. Finally, we· should hold goven1ments accountable for human rights violations
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APPENDIX
List of International Documents protecting Women's Rights
1. Charter of the United Nations
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
4. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
5. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
6. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration
of Marriage
7. Convention on the Political Rights of Women
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
